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| Titre : | How Do Employers Choose between Types of Contingent Work? Costs, Control, and Institutional Toying (2021) |
| Auteurs : | Chiara Benassi ; Andreas Kornelakis |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Industrial and labor relations review - ILR review (vol. 74, n° 3, May 2021) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 715–738 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ TRAVAIL PRECAIRE ; PRATIQUE DE GRH ; COUT DE LA MAIN D'OEUVRE ; RELATIONS PROFESSIONNELLES ; LEGISLATION DU TRAVAIL ; ORGANISATION DU TRAVAIL ; SOCIOLOGIE DES ORGANISATIONS ; ETUDE DE CAS ; INDUSTRIE AUTOMOBILE ; RECHERCHE-DEVELOPPEMENT ; ALLEMAGNE |
| Résumé : | The increasing variety of contingent work raises the question of how employers choose between various types of contractual arrangements. The authors review relevant Employment Relations and Strategic HRM literature and distinguish four types of contingent contracts along the dimensions of costs and control. They argue that employers are making choices based on cost and control constraints but are able to reshape these constraints through “institutional toying.” Their case study of a German manufacturing plant and R&D center illustrates the mechanisms of institutional toying, which are consistent with the literature on institutional loopholes and exit options. The article develops propositions that explain the diversity of contingent work arrangements and show how toying strategies enlarge the range of options available to employers. |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793920944910 |
