Accueil
| Titre : | Working conditions and regulation (2017) |
| Auteurs : | Philipp Weinschenk |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Labour economics (vol. 44, January 2017) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 177-191 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ CONDITION DE TRAVAIL ; HYGIENE-SECURITE ; ACCIDENT DU TRAVAIL ; MALADIE PROFESSIONNELLE ; STRESS ; LEGISLATION DU TRAVAIL ; POLITIQUE DE L'EMPLOI ; NEGOCIATION ; POLITIQUE SALARIALE ; PRATIQUE DE GRH ; ECONOMETRIE |
| Résumé : | Do employers invest sufficiently in the working conditions of employees? We examine this question in a simple principal-agent model. We show that, even though investment is contractible, the principal underinvests whenever her agent's alternatives are rather poor. This provides a reason for regulation. The indirect regulatory approach of taking measures that improve the agent's bargaining power or outside option at least weakly enhances the agent's well-being and welfare. The direct regulatory approach of demanding a certain standard of working conditions increases the principal's investment, but may nonetheless leave the agent's well-being unaffected and deteriorate welfare. This holds true since due to a standard, the principal may provide the agent with a lower-powered incentive scheme and implement a lower effort level. (Source : revue) |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092753711730043X |
