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| Titre : | Match quality and contractual sorting (2020) |
| Auteurs : | João Alfredo Galindo da Fonseca ; Gallipoli Giovanni ; Yaniv Yedid-Levi |
| Type de document : | Article : document électronique |
| Dans : | Labour economics (vol. 66, October 2020) |
| Article en page(s) : | Article 101899 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ RECRUTEMENT ; SAVOIR PROFESSIONNEL ; PRODUCTIVITE DU TRAVAIL ; SALAIRE ; INDIVIDUALISATION DU SALAIRE ; POLITIQUE SALARIALE D'ENTREPRISE ; PRATIQUE DE GRH ; ETATS UNIS |
| Résumé : | This paper examines the impact of match-specific heterogeneity on compensation arrangements. In a stylized contractual choice problem we show that employers may have an incentive to offer performance-based contracts when match-specific productivity is high. We test the empirical content of this hypothesis using the NLSY79, which contains information about individual job histories and performance pay. We find that better match quality does affect pay arrangements, employment durations and wage cyclicality. Direct evidence on the accrual of job offers to workers lends support to the hypothesis that employers use performance-related compensation to preserve high-quality matches. |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101899 |
