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| Titre : | Incentive pay and performance: Insider econometrics in a multi-unit firm (2018) |
| Auteurs : | Hein Bogaard ; Jan Svejnar |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Labour economics (vol. 54, October 2018) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 100-115 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ BANQUE ; POLITIQUE SALARIALE D'ENTREPRISE ; SALAIRE D'EFFICIENCE ; PRATIQUE DE GRH ; ECONOMETRIE ; MODELISATION ; EUROPE |
| Résumé : | Exploiting organizational reforms in a foreign-owned bank in Central-East Europe, we carry out an insider econometrics study of the implementation of modern human resource management reforms giving some employees high-powered incentives. We use branch-level panel data and particular features of the reform process to implement two estimators that address endogeneity bias (an outstanding issue in this literature) in a complementary fashion: an IV approach and Generalized Propensity Score estimation. In line with theory we show that some reforms had a positive impact on productivity. We also underscore the risks of introducing quantity-based incentives where quality is important. (Source : revue) |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537117300386 |
