Accueil
| Titre : | Alternating offers with asymmetric information and the unemployment volatility puzzle (2018) |
| Auteurs : | Pierrick Clerc |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Labour economics (vol. 50, March 2018) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 87-91 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ CHOMAGE ; SITUATION DU MARCHE DU TRAVAIL ; OFFRE D'EMPLOI ; SALAIRE ; NEGOCIATION ; MODELISATION ; ECONOMETRIE ; ETATS UNIS |
| Résumé : | To provide micro-founded real wage rigidities, the literature on the unemployment volatility puzzle has considered alternating offers on one side, and asymmetric information on the other. Separately, however, these two frameworks deliver a limited amount of wage stickiness and thus require questionable calibrations to raise unemployment fluctuations. In this paper, we argue that the alternating offers model with one-sided asymmetric information, which combines the two frameworks, gives a more satisfactory answer to the puzzle. The results are improved along two dimensions. First, we show that this model is capable to generate large unemployment movements for a realistic calibration. Secondly, the model produces a right degree of real wage pro-cyclicality for such a calibration and therefore delivers a micro-founded explanation to real wage rigidities. |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537117302695 |
