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| Titre : | The Peak of Capital? Super-Rich Capitalist Families in Global Interlocking Directorate Networks (2024) |
| Auteurs : | Lukas Arndt |
| Type de document : | Article : document électronique |
| Dans : | Revue française de sociologie (vol. 64, n° 1-2, 2023/1-2) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 55-84 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ METIER DE LA DIRECTION GENERALE ; CLASSE SUPERIEURE ; FAMILLE ; NIVEAU DE VIE ; RESEAU SOCIAL ; GRANDE ENTREPRISE ; SOCIOLOGIE DES ORGANISATIONS ; MONDE |
| Résumé : | Do capitalist families concentrate economic power through coordinating capital in networks of interlocking directorates? This study analyzes how super-rich capitalist families are embedded in the 2020 network of interlocking directorates common to the world’s largest 254,207 firms and their 1,473,149 top managers and directors. I identify 4,250 family members from 2,313 super-rich families, each with an estimated family net worth of US$250 m or more. I map these family members in the networks between firms and between individuals. Factors facilitating super-rich participation in global and national networks of interlocking directorates are tested using logistic regression models. Results show that, first, directors belonging to super-rich families are more likely to be embedded in corporate elite networks than are other directors. Family-level explanatory variables such as family wealth and size of a dynasty further increase the odds of forming part of the largest connected component. The share of firms with any type of super-rich involvement increases towards the core of the global network–but only up to a share of about 20% of all firms. Second, two individuals’ being members of two different super-rich families does not increase the odds of their sitting on the same board. This speaks against the idea, suggested by the class cohesion model, that super-rich capitalists coordinate on corporate boards because they are driven by shared interests based on the commonality of owning or controlling capital. Instead, large, listed firms seem to hire members of super-rich families to supervisory positions, possibly to utilize either their prestige, as a signal of credibility for stakeholders, or their contacts, as potential clients, and investors. |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.641.0055 |
