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| Titre : | Testing the independence of job arrival rates and wage offers (2020) |
| Auteurs : | Christine Braun ; Bryan Engelhardt ; Benjamin Griffy ; Peter Rupert |
| Type de document : | Article : document électronique |
| Dans : | Labour economics (vol. 63, April 2020) |
| Article en page(s) : | Article 101804 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ CHOMEUR ; RECHERCHE D'EMPLOI ; SALAIRE ; INDEMNISATION DU CHOMAGE ; DUREE DU CHOMAGE ; CHOMAGE ; ETATS UNIS |
| Résumé : | Is the arrival rate of a job independent of the wage that it pays? We answer this question by testing whether unemployment insurance alters the job finding rate differentially across the wage distribution. To do this, we use a Mixed Proportional Hazard Competing Risk Model in which we classify quantiles of the wage distribution as competing risks faced by searching unemployed workers. Allowing for flexible unobserved heterogeneity across spells, we find that unemployment insurance increases the likelihood that a searcher matches to higher paying jobs relative to low or medium paying jobs, rejecting the notion that wage offers and job arrival rates are independent. We show that dependence between wages and job offer arrival rates explains 9% of the increase in the duration of unemployment associated with unemployment insurance. |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101804 |
