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Titre : | Social effects in employer learning: An analysis of siblings (2016) |
Auteurs : | Neel Rao |
Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
Dans : | Labour economics (vol. 38, January 2016) |
Article en page(s) : | pp. 24-36 |
Langues: | Anglais |
Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ SALAIRE ; POLITIQUE SALARIALE D'ENTREPRISE ; RELATION TRAVAIL-FAMILLE ; EVALUATION ; ETATS UNIS |
Résumé : | This paper examines whether wages are based on information about personal contacts. I develop a theory of labor markets with imperfect information in which related workers have correlated abilities. I study wage setting under two alternative processes: individual learning, under which employers observe only a worker's own characteristics, and social learning, under which employers also observe those of a relative. Using sibling data from the NLSY79, I test for a form of statistical nepotism in which a sibling's performance is priced into a worker's wage. Empirically, an older sibling's test score has a larger impact on a younger sibling's log wage than a younger sibling's test score has on an older sibling's log wage. The estimates provide strong support for social effects in employer learning. (Source : revue) |
Document Céreq : | Non |
En ligne : | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537115001104 |