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| Titre : | Financial incentives and labour market duality (2015) |
| Auteurs : | Clémence Berson ; Nicolas Ferrari |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Labour economics (vol. 37, December 2015) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 77-92 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ MESURE POUR L'EMPLOI ; POLITIQUE DE L'EMPLOI ; SEGMENTATION DU MARCHE DU TRAVAIL ; FLEXIBILITE DU MARCHE DU TRAVAIL ; FORME D'EMPLOI ; ECONOMETRIE ; FRANCE |
| Résumé : | The French labour market is divided between workers in permanent jobs and those who alternate fixed-term contracts with unemployment spells. Among other public policies aiming at reducing this duality, financial incentives could induce employers to lengthen contract duration or favour permanent contracts. This article develops a matching model fitted to the French labour market characteristics and calibrated on French data. A gradual decrease in unemployment contributions or a firing tax reduces the share of short-term contract in total employment but increases market rigidity and lowers labour productivity. However, decreasing unemployment contributions gradually is less favourable for new entrants than a firing tax and lengthens unemployment spells. An additional contribution levied on short-term contracts to finance a bonus for permanent-contract hirings also decreases labour market duality and increases activity by 0.13% but without negative impacts on labour market flexibility and productivity. (Source : revue) |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
