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| Titre : | Consider This: Training, Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete (2019) |
| Auteurs : | Evan Starr |
| Type de document : | Article : texte imprimé |
| Dans : | Industrial and labor relations review - ILR review (vol. 72, n° 4, August 2019) |
| Article en page(s) : | pp. 783–817 |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
Thésaurus CEREQ FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE ; SALAIRE ; MOBILITE PROFESSIONNELLE |
| Résumé : | Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the author examines the effect of noncompete enforceability on employee training and wages. An increase from no enforcement of noncompetes to mean enforceability is associated with a 14% increase in training, which tends to be firm-sponsored and designed to upgrade or teach new skills. In contrast to theoretical expectations, the results show no evidence of a relationship between noncompete enforceability and self-sponsored training. Despite the increases in training, an increase from non-enforcement of noncompetes to mean enforceability is associated with a 4% decrease in hourly wages... (source: article) |
| Document Céreq : | Non |
| En ligne : | https://journals.sagepub.com/toc/ilr/current |
