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Social Capital and Migration Intentions in Post-Communist Countries

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Abstract

We analyze the impact of social capital on the willingness to migrate in 28 post-communist and five western European comparator countries using the Life in Transition Survey. We find substantially lower levels of professional social capital among the older cohorts in post-communist than in the comparator countries. In addition, differences in endowments with professional social capital between the post-communist and comparator countries explain 1.5 to 3.9 percentage points of the total 4.0 to 17.0 percentage point difference in the willingness to migrate between the two country groups. Differences in local social capital, by contrast, contribute only little to explaining these differences. Furthermore, the robust positive relationship between the willingness to migrate and professional social capital is mainly due to a strong correlation between these variables among the young in all country groups. We therefore argue that future research should focus on explaining differences in the impact of social capital on migration decisions of different age groups.

JEL-codes: J61, R23, P23, Z1

Keywords: Migration, social capital, transition countries

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1. Introduction

Previous research often finds that social capital impacts on individuals' willingness to migrate and contributes to explaining the substantial differences in migration rates across countries. Kan (2005) and Belot and Ermisch (2009) present evidence that individuals, who have a larger number of friends or persons that can help in an emergency living in their vicinity are significantly less likely to migrate or to move across large distances. David et al. (2010) argue that the differences in migration rates between Northern and Southern European countries are due to a stronger emphasis on local social capital (i.e. contacts to friends and family) than on professional social capital (i.e. memberships in clubs or civil society organizations) in Southern Europe. Bönisch and Schneider (2013) find that such differences also contribute to explaining the differences in mobility intentions between East and West Germans. Very little of this literature, however, focuses on countries other than highly developed market economies. This is a shortcoming, in particular in the context of post-communist countries², because David et al.'s (2010) results suggest that the lower levels, and different structure, of social capital in post-communist countries relative to developed market economies (found by e.g. Raiser et al. 2002, Fidrmuc and Gërxhani 2008 and Bönisch and Schneider 2013) may contribute to explaining the low mobility in these countries (documented by e.g. Andrienko and Guriev 2004, Fidrmuc 2004, Huber 2005, Fouarge and Ester 2009 and Paci et al. 2009).

This paper, therefore, extends the literature on the impact of social capital on migration intentions to 28 little analyzed post-communist and five western European comparator countries that never experienced transition from a planned to a market economy by using data from a large cross-country survey (the Life in Transition Survey, henceforth LiTS). This extension may be of interest because comparing post-communist countries to developed market economies could help to clarify the role of social capital-based explanations for the significant differences in migration rates between these country groups. It may also be interesting because of the sudden and unexpected shock to institutions and political regimes experienced by post-communist countries in the late 1980's and early 1990's. This affected incentives to invest in social capital (see Bönisch and Schneider 2013, and

² To the best of our knowledge next to Bönisch and Schneider (2013), who focus on East and West Germany, only Zhao and Yao (2017), on China, and Cattaneo (2016), on Albania, have so far analyzed such countries.

Raiser et al. 2002). This could potentially lead to marked differences in the distribution social capital among generations socialized before and after the fall of communist regimes in post-communist countries and thus to significant differences in migration intentions among these generations. Finally, such an analysis may also be interesting form a policy perspective, as low mobility has repeatedly been named as an impediment to economic growth, a cause for high and persistent regional labor market disparities and a factor hampering the improvement of living conditions in many countries (e.g. World Bank, 2009).

The paper therefore contributes to two strands of literature. The first is that on the willingness to migrate in post-communist countries cited above. We add to this literature by examining whether differences in social capital in post-communist countries can help to explain low migration rates in these countries. The second contribution is to the literature on the impact of social capital on mobility decisions (see Kan 2005, Belot and Ermisch 2009, David et al. 2010, Bönisch and Schneider 2013). We augment this by testing whether the association between social capital and migration decisions found in developed market economies also applies to post-communist countries that differ markedly from the developed market economies analyzed in most of the literature so far.

2. Theory

We build on two contributions by David et al. (2010) and Bönisch and Schneider (2013). David et al. (2010), while focusing on developed market economies, present a formal model of the link between investments into different forms of social capital and mobility intentions. In this two-period model, individuals in the first period make costly investments into two different utility-generating forms of social capital under uncertainty regarding their earnings in different regions in the second period. These two forms of social capital differ in terms of transferability across regions. The first, referred to as local social capital, which is best thought of as informal strong ties (such as contacts to friends and family), is not transferable across regions. The second, referred to as professional social capital, is closely related to weak ties in formal organizations (such as participation clubs or civil society organizations) and is at least partially transferable across regions.

David et al. (2010) show that in this setting rational forward-looking individuals, after earnings in different regions are revealed in the second period, will choose their place of residence so

as to maximize their second period utility. Consequently, they will base their investments into the two forms of social capital on the expected returns to mobility in the second period. Thus in (an interior) optimum individuals living in regions where returns to migration in the second period are expected to be low relative to the costs (for instance because future income is expected to be high) will invest more into local social capital and less into professional social capital. As a consequence they will also be less mobile in the second period, even if they find themselves in a situation with high ex-post returns to migration. In this model therefore, local social capital causes regional lock-in, while professional social capital may enhance mobility. The model also predicts that residents of countries with low regional disparities (i.e. low returns to migration) and/or restrictions to migration, should invest less into professional (and potentially more into local social capital) than residents of countries with larger regional disparities and no migration restrictions. This may be of relevance in post-communist countries as these were characterized by low regional disparities and severe restrictions on emigration prior to transition (Huber 2007).

Bönisch and Schneider (2013), by contrast, focus on social capital in post-communist countries. They argue that in these, during communism, investments into formalized forms of social capital (such as participation in clubs or civil society organizations), that are also often associated with weak but regionally transferable ties, were low. The reason for this is that the dictatorial communist regimes suppressed or tightly controlled and policed civil-society organizations as they feared that they would facilitate the organization of collective action against them (see also Raiser et al. 2002). Consequently, membership in such organizations was made very unattractive in communist times and residents of these countries also invested in regime-specific forms of social capital (such as membership in the communist party or regime-created organizations) that depreciated with the fall of the communist regimes. This led to a situation in which, upon introducing market forces, residents socialized under communist rule were potentially underinvested in professional social capital.

Taken together these two contributions suggest three hypotheses one could hold with respect to the impact of social capital on migration decisions in post-communist economies. The first of these suggests that lower levels of professional social capital in post-communist may contribute to explaining their residents' low willingness to migrate. The second holds that low levels of professional

social capital should in particular apply to the older generations in post-communist economies. The third holds that these differences in social capital between generations should also result in larger differences in the willingness to migrate between persons socialized under communist rule and those socialized thereafter in post-communist communist than in comparator countries.

3. Method

standard errors.

To assess the validity of the second of these hypotheses the current paper uses descriptive analysis, while to test the first and third we follow previous literature by running linear regressions³ of a measure of the willingness to migrate⁴ (internally, externally or overall) for individual i living in country $j(y_{ij})$ on a set of social capital measures (sc_{ij}) and further explanatory variables (x_{ij}), that have been shown to impact on the willingness to migrate, such that:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha_j + \beta s c_{ij} + \sum_g \beta_g s c_{ij} + \gamma x_{ij} + \zeta_{ij}$$

where ζ_{ij} an error term, the γ 's are parameters to be estimated and α_j is a set of country fixed effects. These control for (observable and unobservable) country specific impacts on the willingness to migrate that affect all residents alike (such as income or unemployment levels in the country as well as more difficult to measure variables such as cultural and institutional differences).

The central parameters of interest in this regression are β and the β_c 's. β measures the impact of social capital on the willingness to migrate in an arbitrarily chosen reference country group, which in our case will be the Western European comparator countries. The β_c 's measure the deviation of this impact from the reference group in the post-communist country group c, which in our case are Central Eastern European EU (CEE-EU), Former Soviet Union and Asian (FSU) and Balkan countries. In this specification a t-test of the hypothesis that $\hat{\beta}_c = 0$ assesses whether the impact of a particular social

³ The linear probability model is used because it allows to consistently test instrument relevance with clustered

⁴ Measures of willingness to migrate have been used extensively in the migration literature (see Dalen and Henkens 2008 for a survey and Bönisch and Schneider 2013 for an application to the impact of social capital). This is justified by the few observations on actual migration provided in most data sets (in particular in the low mobility context of post-communist countries – see Huber and Nowotny 2016) and by such data having been shown to capture the determinants of actual migration behavior rather precisely (see Dalen and Henkens 2008).

capital variable in country group c differs significantly from the impact in the comparator countries. $\hat{\beta} + \hat{\beta}_c$ provides an estimate of the impact of the respective social capital on migration in country groups other than the comparator countries and an F-test of the hypothesis that $\hat{\beta} + \hat{\beta}_c = 0$ provides a test for whether this impact is statistically significantly different from zero in country group c.

The most important methodological issue in estimating equation (1) is the potential endogeneity of social capital. This arises because investments into social capital are a decision variable and persons with a lower willingness to migrate are also likely to invest more into local social capital (and potentially less into professional social capital). If this is the case OLS-estimates of equation (1) will over-estimate the impact of social capital on the willingness to migrate. In the absence of experimental or quasi-experimental data previous contributions have therefore mostly accounted for this endogeneity by using instrumental variable (IV-)approaches. The instruments used have included the number of siblings and parental education (Belot and Ermisch 2009 and Bönisch and Schneider 2013), lagged social capital and the aggregate social capital in the region (David et al. 2010) and actual experience of the individual in helping someone else (Kan 2007). Of these our data contain only the regional average of the respective social capital variable. Thus, next to OLS regressions we also report results of IV-regressions, which use this variable as an instrument. In these estimates the identification assumptions are that regional social capital is a good predictor of individual level social capital – which can be tested for by standard F-tests - and that average regional social capital does not have a direct impact on the individual level willingness to migrate of its own. Clearly this exclusion restriction may be questionable if regions with higher average social capital are more attractive places to live in and thus (ceteris paribus) less likely to be emigrated from. If this is the case, our IV-estimates would be downward biased. As a consequence, the IV-estimates in the current paper provide an additional robustness check for our results.⁵

⁵ We also ran regressions where country fixed effects were replaced by region fixed effects. This accounts for all observed and unobserved variables at the regional level (such as the regional level of social capital), but does not allow for instrumentation. The results of these regressions (reported in the annex) are qualitatively very similar to those reported in the main part of the paper.

4. Data

The main difference of the current paper from previous contributions is that it focuses on a set of countries that have so far not been analyzed in this literature. To this end we use data from the second wave of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) conducted in 34 post-communist and comparator countries in 2010.⁶ This survey randomly selected 75 (in Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Serbia, Poland, and the UK) or 50 (in all other countries) local electoral units and subsequently randomly chose 20 households within each of these and one person within each household as a respondent. It asked two separate questions on respondents' willingness to migrate abroad and within the country for job related reasons.⁷ Persons who answered one of these questions affirmatively were encoded as willing to migrate, those that answered the first question with "yes" as willing to move abroad and those that answered the second question positively as willing to move within the country. These three variables will be the dependent variables in the analysis below.

In addition, in two separate questions, respondents were asked on the frequency of contact with friends and family. This could be: on most days, once or twice a week, once or twice a month, less often and never. The responses to these questions are used as measures of local social ties. Following David et al. (2010) these are encoded by 1 if the response was "on most days", 2/7 if it was "once or twice a week", 2/30 for once or twice a month, 1/60 for "less often" and 0 for "never". This effectively implies measuring the probability that a respondent meets family members or friends on a given day (David et al. 2010). Further, following both David *et al.* (2010) and Bönisch and Schneider (2013) the responses to a question on whether respondents are members of a given list of (clubs or civil society) organizations is used as a measure of "professional social ties" by counting the number of memberships of a respondent in these organizations. This variable may take on values between zero, if a person was not member of any organization, and 9, if an individual was a member of all

⁶ This survey has previously been used by e.g. Nikolova and Sanfey (2016), Cojocaru (2014) and Broulíková *et al.* (2018). We focus its second wave as its first and third waves (conducted in 2006 and 2016) contain no or incomparable questions on the dependent and most of the independent variables used in the current analysis.

⁷ The wording of the questions on and coding of the key dependent and independent variables is explained in more detail in the data annex to this paper.

organizations listed. It will be referred to as memberships in voluntary organizations below. In addition, the questionnaire collected information on the respondent's age^8 , education (which may be compulsory, secondary or tertiary), gender, marital status, employment status, household size and the number of years a person has already resided in the same community. These will be included as the control variables (x_{ij}) in the analysis below. Furthermore, as our dependent variables are related to moving for job related reasons we consider only active aged (18 to 64-year-old) persons.

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables by four different country groups. These are the comparator countries that did not experience transition from a planned to a market economy (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom), CEE-EU countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia), the Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Serbia, and Slovenia) and the FSU countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan). Consistent with the findings of previous literature (e.g. Fidrmuc 2004, Huber 2005, Paci *et al.*, 2010) respondents in post-communist countries are substantially less willing to migrate than respondents in comparator countries. Differences in the overall willingness to migrate between the post-communist and comparator countries are statistically significant and substantial. They amount to a 9.4 percentage point difference between CEE-EU and comparator countries, 17.0 percentage points between FSU and comparator countries and 4.2 percentage points between Balkan and comparator countries.

They are also more pronounced for the willingness to migrate internally than for the willingness to migrate abroad. The willingness to migrate internally is between 9.6 percentage points (in Balkan countries) and 19.9 percentage points (in FSU countries) lower in post-communist than in comparator countries. The willingness to migrate abroad is, by contrast, 5.2 percentage points lower in

⁸ This was encoded by 10 categorical variables (in 5-year age groups from 16 to 64 years) to account for potential non-linearities.

⁹ We exclude Turkey from the analysis as it is somewhat of a special case given that the other comparator countries are EU countries and allocate Slovenia to the Balkan countries to account for the rather particular form of communist governance experienced in Former Yugoslavia of which Slovenia was a part.

CEE-EU countries and 11.0 percent lower in FSU countries than in comparator countries, but 3.2 percentage points higher in Balkan countries.

{Table 1: Around here}

Also in accordance with previous literature (Fidrmuc and Gerxhani, 2008 Raiser et al. 2002, Bönisch and Schneider, 2013) social capital differs markedly between the regions. In particular membership in voluntary organizations is by 1.0 (in the Balkan countries) to 1.5 (in FSU countries) memberships per person lower in post-communist than in comparator countries. Although respondents in CEE-EU and FSU countries also have a lower frequency of meeting friends and family (while for Balkan countries only the frequency of meeting family is lower than in the comparator countries) these differences are rather small.

{Figure 1 around here}

Consistent with our second hypothesis, there are also marked differences in the age profiles with respect to memberships in voluntary organizations (Figure 1). In comparator countries, these increase after the age of 25, but in all post-communist country groups they reduce or stay constant after this age. The age profiles of the frequency of meeting friends and family, by contrast, are rather similar for all country groups. Thus, differences in memberships in voluntary organizations between post-communist and comparator countries are particularly large among older generation that spent their formative years under communism, while these differences are much smaller for young persons socialized during transition. This is corroborated by the results reported in Table 2. This presents an analysis of the differences in social capital and willingness to migrate between post-communist and comparator countries for different cohorts. In this, we focus on persons that were younger than 26 (in the top 4 rows) and older than 40 (in the bottom 4 rows) in 2010 (i.e. we compare persons, who were aged five or less, to persons older than 20 at the time of political reforms in the post-communist countries in the 1990s). This ensures that the younger cohort may is a post-communist generation,

while the older cohort experienced their impressionable years in communist times.¹⁰ Consistent with our second hypothesis memberships in voluntary organizations are substantially (by a factor of 1.5) higher among the older cohort in the comparator countries than among the young. In all post-communist country groups, the older cohort in average has fewer memberships in voluntary organizations than the younger one.

Evidence on the indicators of the willingness to migrate, is less clear cut. In the comparator countries the younger cohort is 1.7 times as likely to be willing to migrate as the older one, while in the post-communist countries this ratio ranges between 2.0 and 2.5. Absolute differences between post-communist and comparator countries in all measures of willingness to migrate are, however, larger for the younger than the older cohort. This questions the hypothesis that the large differences in membership in voluntary organizations feed into large differences in migration intentions between generations in post-communist than comparator countries. Finally, the differences among cohorts in meeting with friends and families are much less pronounced. Both in the comparator and the post-communist countries the young and older cohorts meet their family equally often, while the frequency of meeting friends is only slightly lower among the young than the older cohort in all country groups.

{Table 2: around here}

5. Regression Results

5.1 Baseline Regression

Table 3 shows the estimation results of equation (1) for three different dependent variables (the overall, internal and external willingness to migrate). Columns labeled "OLS" present results of OLS estimates, while columns headed "IV" report results of instrumental variable estimates, where the social capital variables are instrumented by their regional averages (i.e. the electoral units which are

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¹⁰ We exclude persons in their late childhood and early adulthood in 1990 to avoid including persons in age groups that have been shown to have rather unstable attitudes in previous literature (see e.g. Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). In our robustness checks in the annex we, however, also provide regression results for those aged older than 26 and younger than 40.

the primary sampling unit in the LiTS).¹¹ The results in the first two columns of Table 3 indicate a robust positive and statistically significant correlation between the number of memberships in voluntary organizations and all measures of the willingness to migrate in all country groups. One additional membership in a voluntary organization is associated with an increase in the overall willingness to migrate by 1.3 to 3.9 percentage points in the comparator countries. The estimates in columns 4 to 6 indicate that this effect is somewhat stronger for the willingness to migrate abroad (ranging from 2.3 to 3.4 percentage points) than for the willingness to migrate internally (which is close to that of the overall willingness to migrate).

{Table 3: around here}

The estimates for the interactions of the voluntary organization variable with the country group dummy variables do not indicate a statistically significant difference from the comparator countries (except for a weakly significant difference for FSU countries in the case of uninstrumented results for the willingness to migrate abroad). Therefore, while endowments with professional capital are very different in the post-communist countries and the comparator countries, the reaction of migration intentions to such professional social capital are rather similar. The implied parameter estimates for each country group and the associated F-tests (reported in the bottom panel of Table 3), indicate that memberships in voluntary organizations also affect all dependent variables positively and significantly in all post-communist countries. This, in accordance with the results by David et al. (2010), implies that higher investments in social capital are also associated with a higher willingness to migrate in all country groups analyzed in the current paper.

The results for the frequency of meeting friends and family differ substantially across country groups and are also not robust across specifications. As can be seen from the bottom panel of Table 3 the frequency of meeting friends is statistically significantly positively associated and the frequency of meeting the family statistically significantly negatively with all measures of the willingness to migrate

¹¹ Tables A.1 to A.3 in the annex to the paper report full regression outputs and Table A4 reports F-tests for instrument relevance. These suggest that the instruments are highly relevant throughout.

in uninstrumented regressions in the comparator countries. These coefficients, however, loose significance in IV-estimates for all dependent variables. In the CEE-EU countries the frequency of meeting friends is statistically significantly negatively associated with all measures of the willingness to migrate, while results are less robust for the impact of the frequency of meeting friends on all measures of the willingness to migrate. In the FSU countries these variables are mostly statistically insignificant, while in the Balkan countries, the frequency of meeting the family is negatively and statistically significantly associated with the willingness to migrate for all dependent variables, while the frequency of meeting friends is positive and statistically significant throughout. Although (as evidenced by the results in the top panel of Table 3) the coefficient estimates are very rarely statistically significantly different from those of the comparator countries, this may point to a different role of friendship ties in the Balkan countries than in the CEE-EU and FSU countries. One could for instance hypothesize that in the context of the diasporas and civil wars experienced by these countries in the recent past, friends may be an important source of information on job opportunities elsewhere, such that a higher contact frequency with friends may increase willingness to migrate.

5.2 Results by age groups

Table 4 extends on this by reporting results from estimating equation (1) separately for persons that were younger than 26 in 2010 and socialized mainly after the fall of communism in the post-communist countries and people who were 40 to 65 in 2010 and were socialized under communist rule. It thus analyzes whether the marked differences in memberships in voluntary organizations between generations found in the descriptive analysis are associated with differences in the reaction of mobility intentions to social capital in the post-communist and comparator countries between these generations.

According to these results, the positive association of the willingness to migrate with the number of memberships of voluntary organizations is primarily due to the young. Memberships in voluntary organizations are significantly positive among the young cohorts for all dependent variables in all country groups but the CEE-EU member states. One additional membership in a voluntary organization of the young is associated with an increase in the willingness to migrate by 5.7 to 10.0 percentage points and in the willingness to migrate internally by up to 12.4 percentage points in the

comparator countries. In the post-communist countries these effects are substantially (and in the case of the CEE-EU and Balkan countries also statistically significantly) smaller and range somewhere between 1.6 to 6.0 percentage points. For the elder, as shown in the bottom left hand side panel of Table 4, memberships in voluntary organizations robustly increase the willingness to migrate for the CCE-EU and Balkan countries, but are insignificant throughout for the FSU and comparator countries (except for the case of the internal willingness to migrate among the elder in the comparator countries in uninstrumented estimates).

{Table 4: Around here}

Furthermore, the results for the frequency of meeting friends and the family provide no evidence of a robust impact on migration intentions of the young or the elder. For the elder, these measures of local social capital are statistically insignificant for almost all country groups and dependent variables (except for a robust negative impact of the frequency of meeting the family in the Balkan countries). For the young, the frequency of meeting the family has a robust significant impact only on the willingness to migrate abroad in the CEE-EU and Balkan countries, but not in the FSU and comparator countries, while the frequency of meeting the family is negatively associated with the willingness to migrate of the young in the Balkan countries, only.

5.3 Quantitative importance of differences

To assess the quantitative importance of social capital in explaining differences in migration intentions across country groups and generations we use the parameter estimates for the comparator countries to predict the change in the average willingness to migrate that would result if the post-communist countries had the same levels of social capital as the comparator countries. These predicted changes are shown in Table 5 for the overall population (in the top panel), the young (in the middle panel) and the elder (in the bottom panel). These results suggest a substantial contribution of social capital variables to differences in the willingness to migrate between the post-communist and comparator countries. Together the differences in social capital variables account for 1.5 (using OLS estimates) respectively 2.5 (using IV-estimates) percentage points of the 9.4 percentage point

difference in the overall willingness to migrate between the CEE-EU and comparator countries. For the FSU countries this accounts for 2.1 to 3.2 percentage points of a total difference of 17.0 percentage points and for the Balkan countries for 0.8 to 2.1 percentage points of a total of 4.0.

This contribution, however, is solely due to the impact of the differences in memberships in voluntary organizations. In the CEE countries this variable alone accounts for 1.8 (using OLS estimates) respectively 3.1 (using IV-estimates) percentage points of the difference in the willingness to migrate to comparator countries. In the FSU countries this contribution is 2.2 to 3.9 percentage points and in the Balkan countries 1.5 percentage points to 2.7 percentage points. Furthermore, this contribution is also larger for explaining the gap in the willingness to migrate abroad than to the gap in the willingness to migrate internally, although (as shown in Table 1) overall gaps are substantially smaller for willingness to migrate abroad than willingness to migrate internally.

{Table 5: Around here}

The contribution of social capital variables to explaining the age specific differences in the willingness to migrate between the post-communist and comparator countries is much smaller. Somewhat at odds with our expectations, because of the low and insignificant impact of memberships in voluntary organizations, social capital variables in general and memberships in voluntary organizations in specific, contribute substantially less to the differences in the willingness to migrate between the country groups among the older than the younger cohort. Consequently, these variables also explain little of the differences in age profiles in the willingness to migrate between the country groups. For the older cohort differences in social capital variables explain around 1 percentage point of the total 9 to 20 percentage point difference in the overall willingness to migrate and between 2 to 3 percentage points of the 4 to 15 percentage point difference to migrate abroad. For the young this contribution, depending on the country group considered, ranges from 3 to 10 percentage points of a total 4 to 28 percentage point difference and a similar amount to the much smaller difference in the willingness to migrate abroad.

6. Summary

In sum, the evidence collected in this paper is, therefore, consistent with the hypotheses that older generations in post-communist economies have substantially lower levels, and a different structure, of social capital than their peers in developed market economies. Descriptive evidence suggests that memberships in voluntary organizations are substantially lower among the older cohorts in the post-communist countries than in the comparator countries. The evidence also supports the hypothesis that the lower levels of professional social capital in post-communist relative to other countries contribute to explaining the overall lower willingness to migrate in these countries. The number of memberships in voluntary organizations is robustly positively and statistically significantly associated with the willingness to migrate in both post-communist and comparator countries. Our estimates suggest that somewhere between 1.5 to 3.9 percentage points of the total 4.0 to 17.0 percentage point difference in the willingness to migrate between post-communist and comparator countries can be explained by the lower number of memberships in voluntary organizations in post-communist countries.

By contrast, the results for the frequency of contacts to friends and family vary across country groups and depend on specifications. If anything, the frequency of meeting friends is positively and the frequency of meeting the family negatively associated to the willingness to migrate. Irrespective of this, however, the contribution of these variables to differences in willingness to migrate between post-communist and comparator countries is only minor. Adding these variables in general slightly reduces the contribution of social capital variables to explaining differences in the willingness to migrate.

The third hypothesis of this paper, namely that the differences in the number of memberships in voluntary organizations among generations socialized before and after transition in post-communist and comparator countries lead to (and can explain) differences in the age profiles of willingness to migrate between the different country groups is, however, not confirmed by the current analysis. Rather we find that the robust positive relationship between willingness to migrate and membership in voluntary organization is mainly due to a strong correlation between these variables among the young in all country groups. While we have few explanations for this stylized fact, this suggests that future

research in this field could focus on explaining differences in the impact of social capital on migration decisions of different age groups.

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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by country groups

	CEE countries	ECII tri	Delless countries	Comparator countries
337'11'	CEE countries	FSU countries	Balkan countries	
Willing to migrate	0.385***	0.309***	0.437***	0.479
	(0.487)	(0.462)	(0.496)	(0.500)
Willing to migrate internally	0.310***	0.231***	0.334***	0.43
	(0.462)	(0.421)	(0.472)	(0.495)
Willing to migrate abroad	0.291***	0.233***	0.375***	0.343
	(0.454)	(0.423)	(0.484)	(0.475)
Meet friends	2.623***	2.516***	2.956***	2.765
	(0.978)	(1.108)	(0.968)	(0.907)
Meet family	2.260***	2.229***	2.350***	2.429
	(0.990)	(1.035)	(1.028)	(1.042)
Voluntary org. member	0.699***	0.389***	0.871***	1.882
, 0	(1.171)	(1.017)	(1.425)	(1.772)
Years of residence	33.298***	31.714***	32.748***	26.949
	(16.948)	(16.018)	(15.849)	(18.157)
Vocational or high school educated	0.543***	0.460***	0.582***	0.516
C	(0.498)	(0.498)	(0.493)	(0.500)
Tertiary educated	0.356***	0.524***	0.232***	0.415
,	(0.479)	(0.499)	(0.422)	(0.493)
Married	0.583***	0.677***	0.651***	0.532
	(0.493)	(0.467)	(0.477)	(0.499)
Male	0.410***	0.364***	0.442	0.437
	(0.492)	(0.481)	(0.497)	(0.496)
Employed	0.593***	0.491***	0.465***	0.671
<u>F</u>)	(0.491)	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.470)
Household size = 2	0.319	0.201***	0.214***	0.331
	(0.466)	(0.401)	(0.410)	(0.471)
Household size > 2	0.500***	0.719***	0.695***	0.427
	(0.500)	(0.449)	(0.460)	(0.495)

Source: LiTS 2010: Values in brackets are standard errors. ***, (**), [*] signify significant differences between the means of the respective country group and the comparator countries at the 1%, (5%), [10%] level.

Table 2: Willingness to migrate and social capital by age and country groups

Country group	Willing to migrate	Willing to migrate internally	Willing to migrate abroad	Meeting friends	Meeting family	Voluntary org. membership
		Young	(aged less than 26)			
Comparator countries	0.724	0.687	0.537	3.279	2.402	1.379
•	(0.448)	(0.464)	(0.499)	(0.840)	(1.041)	(1.463)
CEE-EU countries	0.681	0.551***	0.584*	3.093***	2.274**	0.836***
	(0.467)	(0.498)	(0.493)	(0.868)	(0.991)	(1.332)
FSU countries	0.441***	0.338***	0.350***	2.774***	2.263**	0.428***
	(0.497)	(0.473)	(0.477)	(1.093)	(1.054)	(1.063)
Balkan countries	0.599***	0.461***	0.531	3.221	2.500*	1.009***
	(0.490)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.884)	(0.999)	(1.643)
		Older (aged more than 40)			
Comparator countries	0.417	0.368	0.297	2.623	2.39	2.01
•	(0.493)	(0.482)	(0.457)	(0.912)	(1.032)	(1.824)
CEE-EU countries	0.268***	0.215***	0.179***	2.464***	2.208***	0.662***
	(0.443)	(0.411)	(0.383)	(0.997)	(1.008)	(1.117)
FSU countries	0.218***	0.156***	0.154***	2.408***	2.169***	0.378***
	(0.413)	(0.363)	(0.361)	(1.117)	(1.036)	(0.978)
Balkan countries	0.326***	0.250***	0.271**	2.808***	2.225***	0.810***
	(0.469)	(0.433)	(0.444)	(0.998)	(1.034)	(1.254)

Source: LiTS 2010: Values in brackets are standard errors. ***, (**), [*] signify significant differences between the means of the respective country group and the comparator countries at the 1%, (5%), [10%] level.

Table 3: Baseline regression results

Table 5: Baseline regression resul		o migrate	Willing t	o migrate	Willing to	o migrate
		C	inter			nally
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Voluntary org. membership	0.015**	0.027***	0.013**	0.021**	0.023***	0.034***
, , ,	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Voluntary org. membership* CEE-EU	0.007	0.012	0.003	-0.0002	-0.005	-0.003
countries	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.013)
Voluntary org. membership* FSU	0.003	-0.006	0.008	-0.001	-0.014*	-0.014
countries	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Voluntary org. membership*Balkan	0.005	-0.01	0.006	0.002	-0.005	-0.022
countries	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.024)
Meet friends	0.023**	0.008	0.023***	0.018	0.032***	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	-0.006	-0.015	-0.011	-0.023	-0.009	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.008)	(0.026)
Meet friends* FSU countries	-0.016	0.003	-0.024**	-0.01	-0.024***	0.017
	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.008)	(0.016)
Meet friends*Balkan countries	-0.003	0.05	-0.007	0.04	-0.011	0.054**
	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.012)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.025)
Meet family	-0.033***	-0.044	-0.035***	-0.045	-0.029***	-0.040**
	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.018)
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	0.017*	0.016	0.017*	0.016	0.012	0.009
-	(0.010)	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.008)	(0.025)
Meet family*FSU countries	0.021**	0.027	0.029***	0.042	0.017**	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.024)
Meet family*Balkan countries	-0.003	-0.04	0.005	-0.033	-0.006	-0.036
-	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.027)
Observations	28,406	28,406	28,406	28,406	28,406	28,406
Adjusted R2	0.136	0.132	0.113	0.11	0.124	0.119
	Implied	coefficients ($(\hat{\beta} + \hat{\beta}_c)$ and si	gnificance lev	els for countr	y groups
Meet friends in CEE-EU countries	0.017***	-0.007	0.012**	-0.006	0.023***	0.003
Meet friends in FSU countries	0.007	0.011	-0.001	0.008	0.008*	0.015
Meet friends in Balkan countries	0.02***	0.059***	0.016***	0.057***	0.02***	0.051***
Meet family in CEE-EU countries	-0.016***	-0.028**	-0.018***	-0.029**	-0.016***	-0.031**
Meet family in FSU countries	-0.012**	-0.018	-0.006	-0.003	-0.012***	-0.027***
Meet family in Balkan countries	-0.036***	-0.084***	-0.03***	-0.078***	-0.034***	-0.076***
Voluntary org. membership in CEE-EU	0.022***	0.039***	0.016***	0.021**	0.018***	0.031***
Voluntary org. membership in FSU	0.018***	0.021**	0.021***	0.02**	0.009**	0.02**
Voluntary org. membership in Balkan	0.02***	0.017***	0.019***	0.023***	0.018***	0.012**
Source: LiTS Values in brackets are h						

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) (*) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include the controls listed in Table 2 and country as well as age group fixed effects. These are not reported. F-tests for instrument relevance are reported in the annex (Table A4) full regression output in Table A1 in the annex.

Table 4: Regression results by age groups

in Commercial Control Control	2. 2. 2. E.		-						i			Ī
			Young	ρŪ				•	Elder	er		
	Willing to migrate	migrate	Willing to migrate internally	o migrate	Willing to migrate externally	migrate	Willing to migrate	migrate	Willing to migrate internally	migrate	Willing to migrate externally	migrate
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	N	OLS	N	OLS	N	OLS	77
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	9
Voluntary org. membership	***20.0	0.100**	***250.0	0.124***	0.062***	0.04	600.0	0.015	9000	0.011	0.018***	0.025
,	(0.015)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.016)
Voluntary org. membership* CEE-EU	-0.047**	-0.083*	-0.053**	-0.126**	-0.044**	-0.011	0.011	0.013	900.0	0.005	-0.007	-0.0001
countries	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.017)
Voluntary org. membership* FSU	-0.028	-0.056	-0.021	-0.065	-0.039*	0.002	0.002	-0.006	0.003	-0.009	-0.013***	-0.011
countries	(0.018)	(0.061)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.00)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.017)
Voluntary org. membership*Balkan	-0.040**	-0.087*	-0.031	-0.093**	-0.046**	-0.029	0.024**	0.021	0.022**	0.027	0.005	-0.003
countries	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.029)
Meet friends	0.056**	-0.02	0.047	0.047	***660.0	0.082	0.016	-0.015	0.011*	-0.016	0.029**	-0.036**
	(0.028)	(0.102)	(0.029)	(0.103)	(0.028)	(0.120)	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	-0.015	0.071	-0.005	-0.02	-0.049	900.0-	-0.019	-0.004	-0.015	0.003	-0.030**	0.018
	(0.039)	(0.111)	(0.043)	(0.111)	(0.035)	(0.134)	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.027)
Meet friends* FSU countries	-0.03	0.029	-0.041	-0.042	-0.066**	-0.063	-0.015	0.025	-0.01	0.02	-0.028**	0.052***
	(0.033)	(0.109)	(0.033)	(0.106)	(0.030)	(0.124)	(0.015)	(0.035)	(0.00)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Meet friends*Balkan countries	0.011	0.13	0.003	0.026	-0.046	0.015	-0.011	0.052	900'0-	0.055	-0.023	0.058**
	(0.033)	(0.118)	(0.032)	(0.115)	(0.035)	(0.133)	(0.015)	(0.041)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.028)
Meet family	-0.043	-0.004	-0.051*	0.003	-0.049	-0.127*	-0.028***	-0.033	-0.025***	-0.026	-0.027***	-0.02
	(0.028)	(0.097)	(0.029)	(980.0)	(0.033)	(0.075)	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.00)	(0.019)
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	900.0	-0.05	900'0	-0.062	0.004	0.044	0.017	0.024	0.016*	0.016	0.019*	0.023
	(0.030)	(0.101)	(0.033)	(0.090)	(0.035)	(0.082)	(0.011)	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.029)
Meet family*FSU countries	0.027	-0.018	0.043	-0.006	0.031	0.107	0.014*	0.017	0.015**	0.024	0.017	-0.014
	(0.032)	(0.111)	(0.032)	(0.097)	(0.036)	(0.089)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Meet family* Balkan countries	-0.002	960:0-	0.015	-0.091	-0.007	0.016	0.005	-0.036	0.01	-0.029	0.011	-0.03
	(0.029)	(0.099)	(0.030)	(0.087)	(0.035)	(0.079)	(0.010)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.013)	(0.033)
Observations	5,295	5,295	5,295	5,295	5,295	5,295	14,047	14,047	14,047	14,047	14,047	14,047
Adjusted R2	0.12	0.112	0.106	0.098	0.111	0.103	0.111	0.107	0.097	0.094	0.095	0.088
				Implied coefficients (\hat{eta})	ficients $(\hat{\beta} +$	\hat{eta}_c) and sign	gnificance levels for coun	ls for country	y groups			
Meet friends in CEE-EU countries	0.041	0.051	0.042**	0.027	0.05	*970.0	-0.002	-0.019	-0.004	-0.012	-0.002	-0.017
Meet friends in FSU countries	0.026***	0.009	900'0	900.0	0.032***	0.018	0.002	0.01	0.001	0.004	0	0.016
Meet friends in Balkan countries	***290.0	0.11***	0.05	0.073**	0.053***	0.096***	0.005	0.038**	0.005	0.039**	900.0	0.023
Meet family in CEE-EU countries	-0.036**	-0.055*	-0.045***	-0.058*	-0.045***	-0.083**	-0.011	-0.009	-0.009	-0.01	-0.008	0.003
Meet family in FSU countries	-0.016	-0.022	-0.008	-0.002	-0.018*	-0.02	-0.014**	-0.016	-0.01	-0.002	-0.01	-0.035**
Meet family in Balkan countries	-0.045***	-0.1***	-0.036***	-0.087***	-0.056***	-0.111***	-0.023***	-0.069***	-0.016**	-0.055***	-0.016**	-0.05***
Voluntary org. membership in CEE-EU	0.011	0.018	0.004	-0.002	0.018	0.03	0.02***	0.028**	0.012**	0.016	0.012**	0.024**
Voluntary org. membership in FSU	0.029**	0.044*	0.035***	**90.0	0.023**	0.042*	0.011	600.0	0.009	0.002	0.005	0.013
Voluntary org. membership in Balkan	0.017**	0.014	0.026***	0.031***	0.016**	0.011	0.032***	0.036***	0.028***	0.038***	0.023***	0.022**
Source: LiTS Values in brackets are beteroscedasticity robust standard errors	heteroscedastici	ty robinet etar		of the estimate	(**) *** ott	(*) cionify	sionificance	at the 1% ((%) (10%)	lervel All cm	enecifications i	nothed the

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) (*) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include the controls listed in Table 2 and country as well as age group fixed effects. These are not reported. F-tests for instrument relevance are reported in the annex (Table A4) full regression output in Tables A2 and A3 in the annex.


Table 5: Difference in willingness to migrate between post-communist countries groups and

comparator countries due to social capital variables

	Willing	to migrate	Willing to mi	grate internally	Willing to m	igrate abroad
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
			Overal	l Population		
Total						
CEE-EU countries	0.015	0.025	0.013	0.019	0.027	0.032
FSU countries	0.021	0.032	0.018	0.025	0.036	0.041
Balkan countries	0.008	0.021	0.006	0.014	0.015	0.031
Voluntary org. membership						
CEE-EU countries	0.018	0.031	0.016	0.024	0.027	0.039
FSU countries	0.022	0.039	0.020	0.031	0.034	0.049
Balkan countries	0.015	0.027	0.013	0.021	0.023	0.033
			Ŋ	Young		
			(Aged	26 or less)		
Total						
CEE-EU countries	0.036	0.069	0.033	0.100	0.046	0.026
FSU countries	0.077	0.102	0.071	0.157	0.102	0.058
Balkan countries	0.029	0.058	0.029	0.068	0.033	0.030
Voluntary org. membership						
CEE-EU countries	0.031	0.073	0.031	0.091	0.034	0.029
FSU countries	0.055	0.111	0.054	0.137	0.059	0.045
Balkan countries	0.021	0.057	0.021	0.070	0.023	0.023
				Elder		
			(aged 4	40 or above)		
Total						
CEE-EU countries	0.009	0.011	0.006	0.007	0.024	0.022
FSU countries	0.011	0.013	0.007	0.008	0.030	0.025
Balkan countries	0.003	0.014	0.001	0.011	0.012	0.030
Voluntary org. membership						
CEE-EU countries	0.012	0.020	0.009	0.014	0.025	0.031
FSU countries	0.014	0.024	0.011	0.018	0.030	0.038
Balkan countries	0.010	0.017	0.008	0.013	0.022	0.028

Source: LiTS, own calculations. Note: Table reports the change in the average willingness to migrate that would result if the post-communist countries had the same levels of social capital as the comparator countries, based on the coefficients of the comparator countries.

Figure 1: The distribution of social capital variables by age and country groups



Source: LiTS, own calculations.

Annex 1: Coding of dependent and key independent variable

This annex describes the coding of the main dependent and independent variables.

- Willingness to migrate the dependent variables are constructed from two questions that read: "Would you be willing to move elsewhere in our country for employment reasons?" and "Would you be willing to move abroad for employment reasons?" Respondents could reply "yes" or "no". Respondents answering at least one question affirmatively are considered to be willing to migrate. Those that answered the first question positively are considered to be willing to migrate within the country and those that responded positively to the second question are encoded as being willing to migrate abroad
- Meet friends and meet family these measures are based on two questions asking, "How often do you meet up with family members not living in your household?" and "How often do you meet up with friends?" with responses being 1=On most days, 2=Once or twice a week, 3=Once or twice a month, 4=Less than 0nce or twice a month, 5=Never
- Memberships in voluntary organizations is based on a question that reads as "Here is a list of voluntary organizations. For each one, please indicate, whether you are an active member, an inactive member, or not a member of that type of organization". The list of organizations was a) churches and religious organizations, b) sport and recreational organizations and associations, c) art, music and educational organizations, d) labor unions, e) environmental organizations, f) professional associations, g) humanitarian and charitable organizations, h) youth organization and i) parties. The variable was formed by taking the count of organizations of which the respondent was at least an inactive member.
- Years of residence is based on the question "How long have you lived in this city / town / village?".
 Respondents could either provide the number of years or state that they had lived in the city/town/village for their whole life. For persons, who responded that they had lived in the city/town/village for their whole, life their age was entered as the years of residence.

Annexes

Annex 2: Full regression Output and F-Tests

Table A1: Full baseline regression results (dependent variable willingness to migrate)

Tuble 1111 I un busenne l'egl'ession						
	Willing t	o migrate		o migrate		o migrate
	OLS	IV	OLS	nally IV	OLS	oad IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Voluntary org. membership	0.015**	0.027***	0.013**	0.021**	0.023***	0.034***
Voluntary org. membership	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Membership in vol. org.* CEE-EU	0.007)	0.010)	0.003	-0.0002	-0.005	-0.003
countries	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.013)
Membership in vol. org.* FSU countries	0.003	-0.006	0.009)	-0.001	-0.014*	-0.013)
Weinbership in vol. org. 130 countries	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Membership in vol. org.*Balkan countries	0.005	-0.01	0.006	0.002	-0.005	-0.022
Weindership in voi. org. Barkan countries	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.024)
Meet friends	0.013)	0.008	0.023***	0.022)	0.032***	-0.002
Weet mends	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	-0.006	-0.015	-0.011	-0.023	-0.009	0.005
Weet frends CLL-Lo countries	(0.014)	(0.030)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.008)	(0.026)
Meet friends* FSU countries	-0.016	0.003	-0.024**	-0.01	-0.024***	0.017
Weet frends 150 countries	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.008)	(0.017)
Meet friends*Balkan countries	-0.003	0.05	-0.007	0.04	-0.011	0.054**
Wicet friends Barkan countries	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.012)	(0.032)	(0.011)	(0.025)
Meet family	-0.033***	-0.044	-0.035***	-0.045	-0.029***	-0.040**
Trice failing	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.018)
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	0.017*	0.016	0.017*	0.016	0.012	0.009
Weet failing CDE Do countries	(0.010)	(0.035)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.008)	(0.025)
Meet family*FSU countries	0.021**	0.027	0.029***	0.042	0.017**	0.012
Trice faining 150 countries	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.024)
Meet family* Balkan countries	-0.003	-0.04	0.005	-0.033	-0.006	-0.036
Throw raining Barnan Countries	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.027)
Years of residence	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Vocational or high school educated	0.051***	0.047***	0.034**	0.030*	0.039***	0.038***
<i>g</i> =	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Tertiary educated	0.102***	0.096***	0.070***	0.064***	0.090***	0.086***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Married	-0.077***	-0.075***	-0.065***	-0.063***	-0.064***	-0.063***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Male	0.085***	0.084***	0.070***	0.068***	0.082***	0.082***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Employed	0.002	0.001	-0.006	-0.007	0.002	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Household size = 2	-0.011	-0.014	-0.012	-0.014	-0.018	-0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Household size > 2	-0.022*	-0.025**	-0.024*	-0.026**	-0.02	-0.022*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	28,406	28,406	28,406	28,406	28,406	28,406
Adjusted R2	0.136	0.132	0.113	0.11	0.124	0.119
Carrage LiTC Values in Invalues and In						

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) (*) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include country and age fixed effects. These are not reported.

Table A2: Full regression results for persons aged 26 or less

Table A2: Full regression results					337:11:	
	willing t	o migrate		o migrate		o migrate
	OI C	13.7		nally		oad
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
N. 1 1 1	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Membership in vol. org	0.057***	0.100**	0.057***	0.124***	0.062***	0.04
A 1 1 1 1 1 A CEP EV	(0.015)	(0.043)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.028)
Membership in vol. org.* CEE-EU	-0.047**	-0.083*	-0.053**	-0.126**	-0.044**	-0.011
countries	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.032)
Membership in vol. org.* FSU countries	-0.028	-0.056	-0.021	-0.065	-0.039*	0.002
N. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	(0.018)	(0.061)	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.021)	(0.045)
Membership in vol. org.*Balkan countries	-0.040**	-0.087*	-0.031	-0.093**	-0.046**	-0.029
26. 1	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.020)	(0.034)
Meet friends	0.056**	-0.02	0.047	0.047	0.099***	0.082
1 4 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	(0.028)	(0.102)	(0.029)	(0.103)	(0.028)	(0.120)
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	-0.015	0.071	-0.005	-0.02	-0.049	-0.006
	(0.039)	(0.111)	(0.043)	(0.111)	(0.035)	(0.134)
Meet friends* FSU countries	-0.03	0.029	-0.041	-0.042	-0.066**	-0.063
	(0.033)	(0.109)	(0.033)	(0.106)	(0.030)	(0.124)
Meet friends*Balkan countries	0.011	0.13	0.003	0.026	-0.046	0.015
	(0.033)	(0.118)	(0.032)	(0.115)	(0.035)	(0.133)
Meet family	-0.043	-0.004	-0.051*	0.003	-0.049	-0.127*
	(0.028)	(0.097)	(0.029)	(0.086)	(0.033)	(0.075)
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	0.006	-0.05	0.006	-0.062	0.004	0.044
	(0.030)	(0.101)	(0.033)	(0.090)	(0.035)	(0.082)
Meet family*FSU countries	0.027	-0.018	0.043	-0.006	0.031	0.107
	(0.032)	(0.111)	(0.032)	(0.097)	(0.036)	(0.089)
Meet family* Balkan countries	-0.002	-0.096	0.015	-0.091	-0.007	0.016
	(0.029)	(0.099)	(0.030)	(0.087)	(0.035)	(0.079)
Years of residence	-0.003***	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Vocational or high school educated	0.050*	0.048*	0.003	-0.001	0.055**	0.053**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Tertiary educated	0.080**	0.079**	0.028	0.024	0.077***	0.074**
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Married	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.086***	-0.084***	-0.106***	-0.102***
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.024)
Male	0.064***	0.065***	0.040**	0.039**	0.068***	0.065***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Employed	-0.043*	-0.044*	-0.042*	-0.043*	-0.042*	-0.039*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Household size = 2	-0.026	-0.028	-0.028	-0.03	-0.021	-0.018
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)
Household size > 2	-0.029	-0.031	-0.02	-0.024	-0.036	-0.037
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,295	5,295	5,295	5,295	5,295	5,295
Adjusted R2	0.12	0.112	0.106	0.098	0.111	0.103
	V	···	0.100	0.070	V	0.100

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) (*) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include country and age fixed effects. These are not reported.

Table A3: Full baseline regression results for persons aged 40 or more

Table A3: Full baseline regression					W/:11: · 4	a miarata
	willing to	o migrate		o migrate		o migrate
	OLS	IV	OLS	nally IV	OLS	nally IV
	(1)	(2)		(4)	(5)	(6)
Membership in vol. org	0.009		(3)		0.018***	
Membership in voi. org	(0.005)	0.015 (0.015)	0.006 (0.004)	0.011 (0.014)		0.025 (0.016)
Membership in vol. org.* CEE-EU	0.003)	0.013)	0.004)	0.005	(0.002) -0.007	-0.0001
countries	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.017)
Membership in vol. org.* FSU countries	0.007)	-0.006	0.007)	-0.009	-0.013***	-0.01 <i>1</i>)
Membership in voi. org. 150 countries	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.017)
Meet friends	0.009)	-0.015	0.008)	-0.016	0.003)	-0.036**
Meet mends	(0.013)	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	-0.019	-0.004	-0.015	0.028)	-0.030**	0.017)
Weet Helias CEE-EO countries	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.027)
Meet friends* FSU countries	-0.015	0.025	-0.01	0.031)	-0.028**	0.052***
Meet mends. FSO countries	(0.015)	(0.035)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.019)
Meet friends*Balkan countries	-0.013)	0.052	-0.006	0.051)	-0.023	0.058**
Meet mends Barkan countries	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.028)
Meet family	-0.028***	-0.033	-0.025***	-0.026	-0.027***	-0.02
Weet failing	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.009)	(0.019)
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	0.003)	0.023)	0.003)	0.026)	0.009)	0.023
Weet family CEE-EO countries	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.012)	(0.029)
Meet family*FSU countries	0.011)	0.033)	0.010)	0.024	0.012)	-0.014
Weet failing 150 countries	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Meet family* Balkan countries	0.005	-0.036	0.000)	-0.029	0.013)	-0.03
Meet failing Balkan countries	(0.010)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.011)	(0.033)
Membership in vol. org.*Balkan countries	0.024**	0.021	0.022**	0.027	0.005	-0.003
Wembership in voi. org. Barkan countries	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.029)
Years of residence	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.002***
rears of residence	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Vocational or high school educated	0.067***	0.065***	0.056***	0.053***	0.051***	0.050***
v ocational of ingli sensor carcatea	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Tertiary educated	0.117***	0.113***	0.088***	0.083***	0.104***	0.102***
Totally baddated	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Married	-0.048***	-0.049***	-0.040***	-0.041***	-0.036***	-0.038***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Male	0.074***	0.073***	0.064***	0.062***	0.071***	0.072***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Employed	0.015	0.013	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.005
1 3	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Household size = 2	-0.018	-0.020*	-0.021**	-0.023**	-0.029**	-0.033**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Household size > 2	-0.017	-0.019	-0.025**	-0.026**	-0.013	-0.016
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,047	14,047	14,047	14,047	14,047	14,047
Adjusted R2	0.111	0.107	0.097	0.094	0.095	0.088
Source: LiTS Values in brackets are he						(4)

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include country and age fixed effects. These are not reported.

Table A4: F-Tests for Instrument relevance for different specifications

		Willing to	Willing to		Willing to	Willing to		Willing to	Willing to
	Willing to	migrate	migrate	Willing to	migrate	migrate	Willing to	migrate	migrate
	migrate	internally	externally	migrate	internally	externally	migrate	internally	externally
		Full sample			< 26			>=40	
Meet friends*Comparator Countries (base category)	712.6***	712.6***	712.6***	115.9***	115.9***	115.9***	600.2***	600.2***	600.2***
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	***6'90'	***6'90'	***6'90'	100.7***	100.7***	100.7***	614.7***	614.7***	614.7***
Meet friends* FSU countries	740.2***	740.2***	740.2***	118.3***	118.3***	118.3***	629.2***	629.2***	629.2***
Meet friends*Balkan countries	805.8***	805.8***	805.8***	146.7***	146.7***	146.7***	664.4***	664.4***	664.4***
Meet family*Comparator Countries (base category)	718.8***	718.8***	718.8***	146.4**	146.4***	146.4***	568.5***	568.5***	568.5***
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	720.1***	720.1***	720.1***	124.9***	124.9***	124.9***	592.1***	592.1***	592.1***
Meet family*FSU countries	712.8***	712.8***	712.8***	142.1***	142.1***	142.1***	565.1***	565.1***	565.1***
Meet family* Balkan countries	820.8**	950.8***	950.8***	202.4**	202.4***	202.4**	744.1***	744.1***	744.1***
Membership in vol. org. *Comparator Countries (base category)	918.0***	918.0***	918.0***	211.4**	211.4***	211.4***	707.8**	707.8***	707.8***
Membership in vol. org.* CEE-EU countries	84.8***	84.8**	84.8***	247.7***	247.7***	247.7***	750.0***	750.0***	750.0***
Membership in vol. org.* FSU countries	744.3***	744.3***	744.3***	87.8***	87.8**	87.8**	685.1***	685.1***	685.1***
Membership in vol. org. *Balkan countries	1458.9***	1458.9***	1458.9***	348.6***	348.6***	348.6***	1070.1***	1070.1***	1070.1***
Source TTC own calculations Table remorts E-tests of instrument validity for instruments used. These are regional averages for the social canital variables *** (*) signify signify and These are regional averages for the social canital variables *** (*) signify signify and the social canital variables *** (*) signify signify and the social canital variables *** (*) signify signify and the social canital variables *** (*) signify significance of	ant vialidity for	instruments 11	sed These are	regional avera	nes for the cor	ial canital vari	**/ *** oPle	(*) cionify cio	mifficance of

Source: LiTS own calculations. Table reports F-tests of instrument validity for instruments used. These are regional averages for the social capital variables, *** (**) (*) signify significance of the F-test at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. The test statistics suggest that the null of irrelevance of instruments can be rejected throughout.

Annex 3: Robustness checks

This annex reports results of additional robustness checks. These include changing the age definitions for the elder to those that were 26 or older in 2010 (reported in Table A5) and that of the young to those that were 40 or younger at the time (reported in Table A6). Table A7 reports results of the baseline specification in which the country dummies were replaced by region dummies.

Table A5: Full baseline regression results for persons aged 26 or more

				1	
Willing t	o migrate				o migrate oad
OLS	IV		2		IV
					(6)
		0.010**			0.030***
					(0.011)
	` /	` /		. ,	-0.004
					(0.014)
` /	` /		, ,		-0.014
					(0.014)
` /				` /	-0.018
					(0.027)
					-0.015
					(0.014)
· /	()	()	()		0.001
					(0.028)
· /		()			0.029
					(0.018)
					0.054*
					(0.028)
-0.029***					-0.022
					(0.018)
					0.01
					(0.026)
		0.024***			-0.011
					(0.021)
					-0.039
					(0.031)
					-0.001***
					(0.0003)
0.055***	0.052***	0.046***	0.043**	0.039***	0.039***
(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.013)
0.110***	0.106***	0.084***	0.080***	0.095***	0.093***
(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
-0.063***	-0.062***	-0.055***	-0.054***	-0.049***	-0.049***
(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
0.088***	0.086***	0.076***	0.073***	0.083***	0.083***
(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
0.017**	0.016*	0.007	0.006	0.017**	0.015*
(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
-0.014	-0.016	-0.014	-0.015	-0.023**	-0.026**
(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
-0.029**	-0.030**	-0.031***	-0.033***	-0.025**	-0.027**
(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
23,111	23,111	23,111	23,111	23,111	23,111
0.117	0.114	0.1	0.096	0.103	0.098
	Willing to OLS (1) 0.011* (0.006) 0.01 (0.008) 0.002 (0.010) 0.009 (0.012) 0.015 (0.010) -0.013 (0.012) -0.013 (0.012) -0.004 (0.014) -0.029*** (0.008) 0.020* (0.011) 0.018* (0.010) -0.004 (0.011) -0.003*** (0.015) 0.110*** (0.003) 0.055*** (0.015) 0.110*** (0.015) -0.063*** (0.011) 0.088*** (0.019) 0.017** (0.008) -0.014 (0.010) -0.029** (0.012) Yes Yes 23,111 0.117	Willing to migrate OLS IV (1) (2) 0.011* 0.020** (0.006) (0.008) 0.01 0.019 (0.008) (0.016) 0.002 -0.003 (0.010) (0.011) 0.009 -0.001 (0.012) (0.027) 0.015 0.007 (0.010) (0.035) -0.013 -0.028 (0.012) (0.040) -0.013 0.004 (0.012) (0.038) -0.004 0.039 (0.014) (0.043) -0.029*** -0.041 (0.008) (0.031) 0.020* 0.027 (0.011) (0.037) 0.018* 0.022 (0.010) (0.035) -0.004 -0.034 (0.011) (0.035) -0.004 -0.034 (0.011) (0.035) -0.004 -0.034 (0.011) (0.035) -0.004 -0.034 (0.011) (0.042) -0.003** -0.002*** (0.0003) (0.0003) 0.055*** 0.052*** (0.015) (0.014) 0.110*** 0.106*** (0.015) (0.014) 0.110*** 0.106*** (0.015) (0.015) -0.063*** -0.062*** (0.011) (0.011) 0.088*** 0.086*** (0.009) (0.009) 0.017** 0.016* (0.008) (0.008) -0.014 -0.016 (0.008) (0.008) -0.014 -0.016 (0.009) (0.009) 0.017** Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes	Willing to migrate Willing to inter inter OLS IV OLS (1) (2) (3) 0.011* 0.020** 0.010** (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 0.01 0.019 0.005 (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) 0.002 -0.003 0.004 (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.027) (0.009) 0.015 0.007 (0.012* (0.010) (0.035) (0.007) -0.013 -0.028 -0.014 (0.012) (0.038) (0.009) -0.013 -0.024 -0.014 (0.012) (0.038) (0.009) -0.004 0.039 -0.003 (0.014) (0.043) (0.012) -0.029*** -0.041 -0.030*** (0.008) (0.031) (0.007) 0.020* 0.027 0.020* (0.011) (0.035) (0.008) -0.00	OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (0.011* (0.020**	Willing to migrate

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) (*) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include country fixed effects. These are not reported.

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Table A6: Full baseline regression results for persons younger than 40

	Willing t	o migrate		o migrate	_	o migrate
				nally		oad
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Membership in vol. org	0.025**	0.047***	0.026***	0.039***	0.027***	0.050***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Membership in vol. org.* CEE-EU	-0.003	-0.002	-0.008	-0.014	-0.006	-0.016
countries	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.017)
Membership in vol. org.* FSU countries	-0.003	-0.013	0.002	-0.001	-0.016	-0.021
	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.019)
Membership in vol. org.*Balkan countries	-0.013	-0.04	-0.011	-0.023	-0.012	-0.043*
	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Meet friends	0.036*	0.043	0.036*	0.060***	0.050***	0.063**
	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.027)
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	-0.01	-0.048	-0.016	-0.071*	-0.012	-0.046
	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.018)	(0.047)
Meet friends* FSU countries	-0.025	-0.034	-0.040*	-0.052*	-0.037***	-0.051
	(0.024)	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.033)
Meet friends*Balkan countries	-0.003	0.038	-0.011	0.016	-0.018	0.019
	(0.026)	(0.051)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.020)	(0.044)
Meet family	-0.042***	-0.064**	-0.051***	-0.066*	-0.032***	-0.075***
	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.010)	(0.023)
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	0.021	0.018	0.022	0.016	0.007	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.015)	(0.031)
Meet family*FSU countries	0.032**	0.043	0.050***	0.061	0.019	0.05
	(0.014)	(0.045)	(0.015)	(0.045)	(0.013)	(0.033)
Meet family* Balkan countries	-0.006	-0.03	0.009	-0.027	-0.02	-0.023
•	(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.014)	(0.043)	(0.013)	(0.032)
Years of residence	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.001**	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.0005)
Vocational or high school educated	0.029	0.024	0.006	-0.001	0.023	0.019
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Tertiary educated	0.079***	0.072***	0.043**	0.036*	0.068***	0.062***
•	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Married	-0.095***	-0.090***	-0.081***	-0.074***	-0.081***	-0.075***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Male	0.088***	0.087***	0.071***	0.068***	0.085***	0.083***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Employed	-0.012	-0.012	-0.019	-0.019	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Household size = 2	-0.023	-0.023	-0.015	-0.015	-0.021	-0.02
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Household size > 2	-0.054***	-0.055***	-0.041**	-0.043**	-0.050***	-0.050***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,359	14,359	14,359	14,359	14,359	14,359
Adjusted R2	0.114	0.108	0.098	0.092	0.106	0.099

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) (*) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include country fixed effects. These are not reported.

Table A7: Full baseline regression results with region fixed effects

Table A7. Full basefule regression results with reg	•	Willing to migrate	Willing to migrate
	,, ming w migrate	internally	abroad
Meet friends*Comparator Countries (base category)	0.032***	0.029***	0.043***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Meet friends* CEE-EU countries	-0.006	-0.009	-0.014
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Meet friends* FSU countries	-0.025**	-0.033***	-0.036***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Meet friends*Balkan countries	-0.021	-0.022*	-0.029**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Meet family*Comparator Countries (base category)	-0.034***	-0.036***	-0.029***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Meet family*CEE-EU countries	0.020*	0.019*	0.017*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Meet family*FSU countries	0.023**	0.029***	0.020**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Meet family* Balkan countries	0.011	0.020*	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Membership in vol. org.*Comparator Countries (base category)	0.012**	0.011*	0.020***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Membership in vol. org.* CEE-EU countries	-0.001	-0.0003	-0.01
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Membership in vol. org.* FSU countries	0.001	0.008	-0.016**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Membership in vol. org.*Balkan countries	0.008	0.005	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Years of residence	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.001***
37 / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Vocational or high school educated	0.045***	0.028**	0.032***
Tradical desired	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Tertiary educated	0.084***	0.061***	0.069***
Married	(0.013) -0.071***	(0.013) -0.064***	(0.012) -0.059***
Married	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Male	0.082***	0.068***	0.079***
Iviaic	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Employed	-0.005	-0.008	-0.005
Employed	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Household size = 2	-0.013	-0.009	-0.020**
Trousenoru Size Z	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Household size > 2	-0.015	-0.016	-0.014
Trouberford Size > Z	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age group FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	28,406	28,406	28,406
Adjusted R2	0.229	0.2	0.21
Implied coefficients $(\hat{\beta} + \hat{\beta}_c)$ and sign			
Meet friends in CEE countries Meet friends in CEE countries	0.025***	0.020**	0.029***
Meet friends in CEE countries Meet friends in FSU countries	0.023	-0.004	0.029
Meet friends in FYU countries	0.000	0.007	0.007
Meet family in CEE countries	- 0.014	-0.017**	-0.012*
Meet family in FSU countries	-0.014	-0.007	-0.009*
Meet family in FYU countries	-0.023***	-0.007	-0.023***
Voluntary org. membership in CEE countries	0.012*	0.011*	0.01
Voluntary org. membership in FSU countries	0.012*	0.011*	0.004
Voluntary org. membership in FYU countries	0.021***	0.019	0.004
Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity rob			

Source: LiTS. Values in brackets are heteroscedasticity robust standard errors of the estimate, *** (**) (*) signify significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. All specifications include country fixed effects. These are not reported.