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Chronicle of a Death Foretold: Have HRM Practices Finally Replaced Worker Representatives?

A Micro-Statistical Comparison between Great Britain and France

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DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL

N° 105

septembre 2008

ISSN 1629-7997
ISBN 978-2-11-098168-4

**CHRONICLE OF A DEATH FORETOLD: HAVE HRM PRACTICES
FINALLY REPLACED WORKER REPRESENTATIVES?
A MICRO-STATISTICAL COMPARISON BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE**

Thomas Amossé, Loup Wolff

ABSTRACT

Both in France and in Great Britain, management-initiated techniques designed to organise personnel and productive processes have been adopted by an increasing number of companies over the years. Initially, these techniques were conceived to motivate employees by organising their participation, though more recently they have been converted to forms that favour individualised incentives. Such practices are thus likely to compete against institutions for employee representation (such as unions, joint consultative committees, non-union representatives), and may even function as a replacement for them. Addressing this issue within two different contexts, this paper shows how little evidence exists for such a ‘substitution’ scenario. Actually, employee representation structures and management techniques in France and in Great Britain exist side by side most commonly. Considering their respective effectiveness, one seems to have very little effect on the other in France; whereas in Great Britain, they seem to be mutually strengthening.

Mots-clefs : union, employee representation, HRM practices, substitution, coexistence.

***Chronique d'une mort annoncée : les innovations managériales
ont-elles finalement remplacé les représentants du personnel ?
Une comparaison micro-statistique entre la Grande-Bretagne et la France***

Abstract

En France comme en Grande-Bretagne, des dispositifs managériaux visant à organiser le travail des salariés ont été adoptés dans un nombre croissant d'entreprises depuis des années. Initialement ces dispositifs étaient conçus pour encourager la participation collective des salariés, mais ils se sont progressivement transformés en instruments d'une individualisation croissante de la relation salariale. Parce qu'elles touchent à la fois à l'organisation du travail collectif et des collectifs de travail et à la question de la fixation des salaires, ces techniques managériales sont susceptibles de concurrencer les structures de représentation du personnel (syndicats, comités d'entreprise, etc.) et peuvent même être amenées à les remplacer. Cette question, formulée en premier lieu aux États-Unis, est examinée ici dans les deux contextes fort différents du point de vue des systèmes de relations professionnelles que sont la France et la Grande-Bretagne. À partir des enquêtes WERS et REPONSE utilisées en séries temporelles depuis le début des années 1990, nous montrons que contrairement aux États-Unis il y a peu d'éléments empiriques à l'appui de cette hypothèse de « substitution ». De fait, représentants du personnel et innovations managériales (telles que nous les avons définies) vont le plus souvent de pair dans les établissements, en France comme en Grande-Bretagne. À partir de la dimension couplée salarié-employeur de ces enquêtes en 2004, nous montrons également que lorsqu'elles sont toutes deux présentes, ces « institutions » ne semblent pas s'affaiblir mutuellement du point de vue des salariés. En Grande-Bretagne, elles se renforceraient même mutuellement.

Key words: *syndicat, représentation du personnel, dispositif managérial, HRM, substitution, coexistence.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of potential competition between management-initiated techniques and institutions for employee representation first appeared in the United States. Though continental Europe is the birth place of innovations for industrial democracy within the workplace (such as co-determination experiments in Germany), it was in the US that the development of management techniques in the late 70's led to a drastic change in the way issues were addressed by the 'Industrial / Employment relations' community.

1.1. An American issue

Of course, it is difficult, if not vain, to try to pinpoint the first time a research topic is approached. But, concerning this particular issue, as well as the overall subject of the evolution of the employment relations system in the United States, the book by Kochan et al. [1986] is a turning point. It began a fifteen-year period of analysing the relationship between traditional institutions for employee expression (or 'voice') – trade unions in particular – and innovative techniques for people management designed to improve organisational performance. Through this research agenda, the purpose was more or less implicitly to investigate the fate of such trade unions in an era converted to the "new spirit of capitalism" (*nouvel esprit du capitalisme*, according to Boltanski and Chiapello [2005]). In this literature, the focus on the potential death of trade unions explains why these techniques for management remained vaguely defined. In the absence of clear definitions, they were generally categorised under the generic term of Human Resource Management (HRM) practices, as Machin and Wood [2005] pointed out.

These workplace practices mainly referred to managerial attempts originated in the 60's, which aimed to motivate worker participation in a context of strong economic growth and of quasi-full employment. Their adoption wasn't likely to pose a problem for trade unions. For Hirschman [1970], Freeman and Medoff [1984], the key issue was to underline the employee participation mechanisms in the workplace, and the role played by trade unions in this matter. This conceptual framework referred to industrial democracy-related issues which investigate the way workers spontaneously organise their employment relations for "better economic and social performance". The debate then particularly focused on the degree of organisation of companies and of their processes (indifferently by trade unions and employers), rather than the relationship between employee representatives and management staff. However not all trade unions were in favour of the adoption of such techniques (Eaton and Voos [1989]). With the recession that followed both oil shocks in the 70's, the economic context changed radically and weakened the position of the unions. The same techniques that were initially designed to support traditional channels for employee expression actually weakened the unions.

A few years after these first papers, Eaton [1994] describes the disagreement that progressively emerged between trade unions and management about the overt purpose and effectiveness of participative programs at stake, revealing changes in the managerial policies and in the design of the HRM practices. This managerial about-face was already announced in Kochan et al.'s book [1986] and the unions' reluctance was well-known at that time; but both seemed to grow in intensity in this period. Among these HRM practices, High Involvement Management (HIM) replaced the participative programs. According to

Appelbaum and Batt [1994], the new American firms from then on moved back from the “democratic” ambitions they expressed in the 70’s: the ‘economic reality’ principles of the High Performance Work System supplanted the utopia of a participative workplace. Even in the productions of the management literati, the « artistic criticism » (*critique artiste*) of the 70’s – aspiring to broader employee autonomy and participation – is reinterpreted by the “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello [2005]).

A new world has obviously supplanted the former one: while Freeman and Medoff were associating – in a virtuous circle – union presence, specific investment in human capital (intensive use of training programs, better working conditions, higher wages) with an enhanced involvement and productivity of permanent workers, a new equilibrium was setting in: from then on, employees would be individually responsible for their careers and position in the labour market and the firms would focus on their performance, in relation to their adaptation capacity and mobility. In this “new world”, the role of trade unions is bound to be questioned and the HRM practices have naturally shifted from participative ambitions to management techniques more explicitly designed to improve workers individual productivity, notably by individualising compensation policies. A series of papers put forward a critical insight into this development: Clawson and Clawson [1998], and in particular Juratvich [1998] and Milkman [1997] have described how deeply the socio-economic context transformed the participative program into workload intensification. Thus, the issue of a potential relationship between these changes in management-initiated techniques and the base for collective organisation and employee representation seems to have been investigated more and more in terms of competition rather than compatibility. In this perspective, Fiorito [2001] identifies two distinct forms of competition – strong and weak: in the first case, HRM practices simply replace trade unions; in the second case, these practices progressively weaken unions by satisfying their expectations and hence inhibit employees from adhering to an union.

In the US, the issue of competition between unions and HRM practices became noticeable in the mid 80’s and since then has accompanied the shift of HRM practices from participative programs to incentive policies on the one hand and the growing gap between managerial concerns and union position on the other hand.

1.2. Different echoes in France and in Great Britain

Beyond the development of HRM practices, the way this very question has been addressed in France and Great Britain depends on the specificities of national contexts, of structuring of both employment relations systems and of corresponding academic fields.

In France, internal strains between and within trade unions arose at an early stage about the strategies they should embrace once confronted with participative programs. Of course, that was particularly the case with the unions inspired by anarcho-syndicalism: these techniques were stigmatised as instruments for class collaboration. Hence, “*le syndicalisme de proposition*” (collaborative unionism) and “*l’ouverture sur les conseils d’atelier*” (openness toward workforce meetings) found at first little support within the CGT (Moynot [1982]). Lojkiné described the struggle around the setting up of “expression groups”¹ in unionised workplaces [1986] hesitating between inclination for self-management and protest stances.

¹ i.e. meetings between managers and the workforce, where employees have the opportunity to express their concerns directly to senior managers, without hierarchical intermediaries.

However, even among reformist-oriented unions (mainly the CFDT), participative programs were subject of debate. These techniques were immediately assimilated to potential vectors for union weakening, and unions' behaviour fluctuated between frontal opposition and implicit resistance, contentious in most cases.

Yet, probably because the French employment relations system is rather protective towards trade unions (in relation to the law and from the institutional point of view), the issue of replacement of trade unions by HRM practices has never been addressed in these terms. It is all the more the case because sociology and management sciences are drastically segmented in France. Indeed, management sciences in France strikingly ignored union issues, whether from the point of view of the labour movement or of the academic community (Lojkin [1999]): while union-related actors kept the focus on wages and working conditions, managerial concerns evolved towards control techniques designed to enhance supply chains and yield greater benefits. Even in the 80's and 90's, where plant closure and restructurings were striking unionised activities, such management-oriented initiatives were condemned by union confederations, for whom the ultimate aim is the transformation of employment relations. In this contentious context between unions and management, unions mostly stood apart from management-initiated techniques for participation and later for individual motivation. Nevertheless, given the compulsory dispositions organising employee representation in France, this mutual mistrust has never been investigated in terms of competition mechanisms, as Fiorito [2001] did it for Great Britain. French Labour laws state that any workplace has at least to be provided with employee representatives appointed by elections – *délégués du personnel* – in any workplaces of more than 10 employees. Moreover, as long as an employee is willing to represent one of the trade unions within its workplace, management staff, as well as the other employees, can't counter its designation as employee representative². Thereby, the presence of employee representatives is greatly disconnected from local settlements and mostly depends on exogenous rules – which disqualifies most of the 'game theory' approaches of the phenomena.

Despite this mistrustful context, participative programs paradoxically benefited from the Auroux Act (*Lois Auroux*), which initially intended to promote the notion of "employee citizen" and strengthened the missions of institutions for employee representation, notably by setting the periodicity of wage bargaining on an annual basis in each workplace provided with an union representative (Tripiet [1986]). The literature isn't quite unanimous about Auroux Act's impact on unions. Jenkins [2000] for example argues – yet without any empirical elements – that the adoption of management-initiated practices doesn't occur at the expense of unions (quite weak in terms of membership anyway). Brown (Hancock et al. [1991]) stood up for the opposite thesis: according to him, the Auroux Act gave to employers influenced by the Japanese methods an opportunity to develop participative strategies that contributed to divide and weaken unions. However, the period is simultaneously characterised by the success of participative techniques (with the diffusion of expression groups, workforce meeting, suggestion boxes, quality circles, problems solving groups, etc.) and the drastic union membership declining (the number of members has been divided by two between the late 70's and early 90's, cf. Andolfatto and Labbée [1995]).

In Great Britain, almost at the opposite of the French context, the robust structuring of the industrial/employment relations research field (associated with the existence of well-

² It is simply impossible in workplaces of more than 50 employees. Under this threshold, the candidate has to be an elected representative to benefit from these protective dispositions.

recognised surveys) and the voluntary character of the employment relations system (empowering employers with a broader scope for organising management as well as employee expression) allowed the emergence of this issue, as it previously happened in the United States. Lately, the papers by Forth and Millward [2002], Machin and Wood [2005], Bryson et al. [2007] set up an exhaustive state of the art related to this question. However, on the same issue, no empirical research study based on large samples and referring to the post-1998 period has been found. There isn't any evidence of potential change since the 'New Labour' has come in power. The existing studies conclude with a partial replacement of unions by HRM practices – more precisely: a double presence in senior establishments and a merest union presence in the younger ones.

2. SETTING UP THE HYPOTHESES AND RESPECTIVE CONTEXTS

In this paper, we challenge the overall hypothesis of **replacement of employee representatives by HRM practices (H)**, which we formulate in these terms:

(H) In the underlying context of union decline and of HRM practices diffusion – aiming to motivate employee participation, as well as to manage individually employment relations –, are workplaces substituting, directly or indirectly, employee representation by HRM techniques or, on the contrary, are these institutions and practices complementary?

The HRM practices listed (Cf. section 3.1) in this paper roughly correspond to the choices made by Machin and Wood [2005]. Indeed, as the authors noticed it, HRM practices never strictly “replace” unions and employee representatives, in the sense of ‘to do the same thing’: these authors even claim that “neither of HRM practices is likely to offer for alternatives to unions”. But some of these management-initiated techniques, such as individualisation of pay determination and direct communication methods, are likely to partially play their role – in the sense of ‘to do something else, which incidentally prevents employee representation or progressively weakens the existing structures for representation’. The individualisation of employment relations (notably with pay determination) obviously undermines the bases for collective action, amongst which wage bargaining in France as in Great Britain. If actually efficient, the direct communication methods might as well lower employee demand for collective information. We thus consider with Machin and Wood that these issues are at the core of the relationship between Human Resource Management and unionisation. Moreover, contrary to most research papers that are solely focussed on unions, our research intends to embrace all forms of employee representation: union representatives of course, but also non-union representatives and Joint Consultative committee (in Great Britain) / work councils (in France).

2.1. Direct or indirect substitution (existence *versus* responsiveness)

As Fiorito [2001] pointed it out, our overall hypothesis (H) of replacement of employee representation by HRM practices can be rewritten into two sub-hypotheses, far from being disjunctive:

(1) The first sub-hypothesis is focussed on the coexistence or exclusion of institutions of both types, either for employee representation or for HR management (**H₁** – ‘direct substitution’): are HRM practices taking the place of

representative institutions and wiping them out of most workplaces? Such a substitutive mechanism should not only operate in workplaces that are provided with employee representatives, but also amongst those that aren't (i.e. younger ones). In the first case, the progressive adoption of HRM practices should coincide with the disappearing of representation structures. In the second, the HRM practices at work should prevent the installation of any structure for employee representation.

(2) Beyond the previous questioning in terms of institutional presence, the second hypothesis tests the relative effectiveness of both employee representatives and HRM techniques: the substitution might occur more indirectly with a progressive weakening of employee representation by the HRM practices (H_{2a}). In this hypothetical case, still according to Fiorito [2001], employees are quite satisfied by the HRM practices at work and their need for representation would lower. Complementarily, where unions are present, they might be in disfavour of HRM practices and actually undermine their effectiveness (H_{2b}). Both of these statements are focussed on the respective responsiveness of HRM practices and employee representatives in workplaces. As employees are the only witnesses of such responsiveness (beyond the sole registering of their presence), these statements have to be tested through employee perceptions. In the first case (H_{2a}), we will challenge the following issue: are employees claiming that their representatives (unionised or not) are less attentive to their concerns when HRM practices are at work? In the second (H_{2b}), the hypothesis is transposed into the following empirical question: do employees have all the less the impression to be consulted by their management because they benefit from representation structures (unionised or not)?

H_1 and H_2 hypotheses aren't independent since, apprehended in a dynamic process, one might follow the other: H_1 for example might be a middle-term consequence of H_{2a} . Incidentally, we will examine if the presence of HRM practices is positively associated with more dialog-oriented workplaces.

2.2. Description of both national contexts and adaptation of the hypotheses according to their characteristics

As Coutrot [1998] described it, despite the actual convergence of the French and British economies (notably since the Single European Act and the Maastricht treaty), both employment relations systems remain quite specific to each country. In France, Law still stands at the very core of the system, through the centralised setting of a minimum wage, of a maximum working time and through the compulsory dispositions that give a framework for employee expression rights: Which employee representatives are empowered to bargain on which matters? What are the mandates and institutions for employee representation? Which themes should be put into bargaining? How often? All these issues are very explicitly detailed in French Labour law. At the opposite, the British system is historically based on voluntary settlements between agents (employees, employers, unions) and the regulation through legal dispositions remains until now rather exceptional (even if this statement is partially contradicted by the Employment Relations Act and the transposition in Great Britain of the European directive on employee consultation). Unlike the French ones, the British employers have the power to recognise or not unions, when bargaining on wages or on working conditions. No disposition however exists to compel them in a direction or another.

It mainly depends on the local customs and practices, as well as on the ability of unions to weigh on management decisions and to incite management to tolerate them.

The differences identified between the French and British legal frameworks are associated with a distinctive structuring of trade unions and employer organisations in both countries. In France, unions are present in a large proportion of workplaces – there are commonly more than one union per workplace [Amossé, 2006]. But, as French unions are ontologically mandated to represent the employees as a whole (and not only their members), they often suffer free-rider strategies and fail to gather more than a small number of members. In Great Britain, the picture is often described as an increasingly scattered Leopard skin: a lower and declining proportion of workplaces where union representatives are present, but, when they actually are, the membership rate remains high. While British management seems to prove a more pragmatic approach and often recognise the legitimacy of the unions at stake, its French vis-à-vis is known to be traditionally unwilling to discuss with employee representatives subjects that are seen as its own prerogatives (though the presence of these representatives is secured by the law).

These substantial differences in employment relations systems lead to a necessary discussion on the way our research hypotheses should be transposed in each country.

(1) In France, it is quite reasonable to assess that direct substitution (H_1) is impossible, at least on a short-term basis: the eviction of employee representatives only becomes possible with a systematic strategy to undermine employee representation and discourage any single employee to keep a representative mandate or to bid it (either through union designation or through election on an unionised list)³. However, indirect substitution remains a plausible phenomena.

- Concerning the first hypothesis, given the fact that compulsory dispositions are encouraging representation structures, the expected situation would rather be coexistence than exclusion ($H_{1/F}$), with some differences according to the trade unions at work, CFDT and CFE-CGC being a priori more likely to support participative programs⁴, unlike CGT.
- Concerning the indirect substitution hypothesis (H_2), employee perceptions are likely to witness a weakening of the responsiveness of their representatives when HRM practices are in place – a more subtle weakening however than in the case of direct substitution given the ambiguous opinions of employers and employees toward unions and employee representatives⁵. In this case, there might be some differences again between trade unions: the more contentious towards HRM practices being more often undermined by their presence ($H_{2a/F}$ hypothesis). Besides, two distinct features might blur the sign of the effect of unions on HRM practices in France. On the one hand,

³ Yet, such strategies are contrary to the law and might lead the employer to trial.

⁴ Once controlled by size, activity and workforce characteristics, the results might come out with a lesser robustness, as local union behaviour might not respond as much to their institutional belonging (CGT or CFDT or ...) as to specific characteristics of the workplace. Thus, the invalidation of this hypothesis would be interpretable as a consequence of the gap between union commitments at national or interprofessional level and the concrete activity of their units, often more pragmatic, within workplaces.

⁵ In France, employers massively declare that workers are able to defend themselves by their own. Quite paradoxically, they also have faith in the efficiency of employee representatives' actions. On the contrary, workers consider their representatives as rather weak actors, when it comes to provide useful information, to solve individual problems or to forward complaints to the management [Amossé, 2007]. Yet, they support the need for representative structures, unions in particular, in workplaces.

because employee representation is tightly conditioned by Labour laws, it isn't the product of collective mobilisation and is sometimes perceived as imposed by the law rather than by actual needs. In this perspective, union presence would be independent to management responsiveness. On the other hand, the rather broad and ancient presence of unions in French workplaces has contributed to establish a contentious culture towards employer initiatives on employment relations matters. Given both these hypotheses, the effect of union presence on HRM practices may be weakly negative or even null ($H_{2b/F}$). Yet, it might differ from the effects of individual unionisation and of union membership rates within workplaces (both significantly negative) – even if this last indicator is far from summing up the union resources for collective actions in workplaces.

(2) In Great Britain, given the empirical literature and the characteristics of its employment relations system (based on voluntary discussions in each workplace between the employer and its employees), direct substitution mechanisms are more likely to be observed. Continuing the former development, HRM practices and employee representation structures would hybridise in ancient establishments and the first replace the other in younger ones. For the same reasons, indirect substitution is rather unlikely to be observed: given the voluntary character of employment relations, employers won't weaken unions (through HRM practices), once they have recognised them. It is far more simple to prevent them from the start. This being said, the quite recent strengthening of employee rights for representation (notably through the transposition in Great Britain of the European directive) might change the situation and, in a way, move the British system closer to the French one⁶.

- Concerning the first hypothesis, pieces of evidence for the exclusion of employee representation structures by HRM practices should be observed in Great Britain. However, we expect this 'direct substitution' effect to be weaker than in the past ($H_{1/GB}$). Given the voluntary character of the British system, we also expect to observe a greater relationship (in absolute value) between representation structures and management techniques in Great Britain than in France: both are more likely to issue from local strategies and to be simultaneously discussed. The exclusion effect in Great Britain is then expected to be stronger than the coexistence effect in France ($H_{1/F-GB}$).
- About the 'indirect substitution' hypothesis, unless very recent developments, employee perceptions aren't likely to witness any weakening of the responsiveness of their representatives in presence of HRM practices ($H_{2a/GB}$), as there is no specific interest from the employer point of view to undermine them. From the employee point of view, both appear quite complementary in the British context. Indeed, a positive relationship between representation and employee perceptions on HRM practices is expected ($H_{2b/GB}$). The voluntary character of union recognition is, much more often than in France, associated with a cooperative tradition between unions and management staff. As for indirect substitution, we expect to find stronger effects in Great Britain than in France ($H_{2/F-GB}$).

⁶ In Great Britain, the substitution hypothesis has partially been disqualified, with 1998 datasets. However, the development of anti-union feelings amongst young managers (according to the British Social Attitude Survey) might have delayed effects, all the more because they probably got access to higher position since. This is a supplementary reason to continue the analysis with more recent (2004) datasets and to focus on employee perceptions.

Overview of the hypotheses

‘Raw’ hypotheses	Translation of the hypotheses according to the national contexts		
	France	Great Britain	Anglo-French comparison
H₁: Direct substitution			
Exclusion vs. coexistence of HRM practices and employee representation structures	H_{1/F} : rather coexistence	H_{1/GB} : rather exclusion, though recently declining	H_{1/F-GB} : stronger relationship (either positive or negative) in Great Britain than in France
H₂: Indirect substitution			
H_{2a} : Weakening of the employee representation responsiveness in presence of HRM practices?	H_{2a/F} : limited weakening	H_{2a/GB} & H_{2b/GB} : rather mutual strengthening	H_{2/F-GB} : employee representatives and managers perceived as more responsive in Great Britain than in France
H_{2b} : Weakening of the HRM practices responsiveness in presence of employee representatives?	H_{2b/F} : null or limited weakening		

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

In order to test these hypotheses, we use the British WERS⁷ and the French REPOSE⁸ surveys. For the first time, we have gathered the last three editions of both surveys (1990-1992, 1998 and 2004) on a comparative basis, and used the employee-employer matching within both last editions (2004). These datasets have been used in logistic regressions at the workplace level, as well as at the employee level.

3.1. Data: two series of French and British surveys for the first time put together

The fundamental differences that distinguish French and British employment relations systems don't ease the comparison. As Coutrot [1998] wrote it: « il faut avoir à l'esprit ces différences lorsque l'on compare des chiffres bruts, et reconnaître la faiblesse de leur valeur informative intrinsèque: on ne peut comparer d'un pays à l'autre les distributions de variables apparemment élémentaires [...] sans prendre en compte les contextes institutionnels et sociétaux »⁹. However, still according to this author, statistical and econometrical testings usefully contribute to comparative approach for three reasons at least. Firstly because, using contextual variables (such as size, activity or workforce characteristics) in regressions allows to partially control the influence of the respective economic and/or technologic structures of both national economies. Indeed, if workplace size tends to be higher in one of these two countries, union presence would there tend to be “mechanically” more common. Secondly, statistical analysis reveals the different relationships linking employment relations features and contextual variables in each country. For example, workforce skills might have differentiated effects on employee perceptions concerning unions or HRM practices, depending on the specificity of the national context. The comparison of implemented equations in both countries will then shed light on the respective internal logics of the French

⁷ For « Workplace Employment Relations Survey ».

⁸ For « Relations Professionnelles et Négociation Sociale en Entreprise ».

⁹ A translation: “While comparing raw numbers, these differences must be kept in mind and the weakness of their intrinsic informative value must be acknowledged: even concerning elementary features, the comparisons from one country to the other have to take into consideration the institutional and societal contexts”.

and British systems. Finally, econometrical methods help to underline the interaction schemes between the features of employment relations – for example, the link between the setting up of an expression group and the presence of an union delegate (in France), or the impact of union presence on employee perceptions on management responsiveness.

These concerns led us to gather datasets issued from the British and French ‘twin surveys’ on employment relations. As its sister WERS (for a recent presentation, see Kersley et al. [2006]), REPONSE consists of a repeated workplace survey on employment relations with three questionnaires filled per workplace: first of all, a face-to-face interview is conducted with a senior manager responsible for the workplace employment relations; then, providing the information given by this first protagonist and the existence of an employee representation in the workplace, one of the representatives – either elected or designated – is randomly contacted for another face-to-face interview; in parallel, a set of postal questionnaires is sent to a pool of employees – randomly selected amongst all the employees of the workplace. Although the overall characteristics of the survey design are the same, some methodological features are different. The main one concerns the fields of both surveys, which aren’t exactly the same: 2004 WERS covers all workplaces with more than five employees (including public sector), whereas REPONSE is focussed on the workplaces of more than twenty employees in the market sector (agriculture excepted).

Our analysis is restricted to workplaces with 50 workers or more (the only field where comparisons are possible throughout the three editions of the French and British surveys). Our work is also limited by the variables simultaneously available in the WERS and REPONSE editions. These datasets together enable to apprehend national specificity in relation to employment relations. Moreover, since we are taking advantage from their properties (time series and linked employer-employee dimensions), they constitute an original material when analysing employment relations developments (H_1 ‘direct substitution’ hypothesis) and employee perceptions (H_2 ‘indirect substitution’ hypothesis). Such an empirical investigation carries on Coutrot’s [1998] comparative micro-statistical study. It also extends to France and to a more recent period some papers published about the British situation (Machin and Wood [2005] for example). We also have the ambition to overstep a strictly institutional approach of employment relations practices, by simultaneously analysing the formal presence of representative institutions and HRM practices, as well as the employee point of view towards them. Even if the indicators described in the following can’t reasonably pretend to sum up the whole complexity of employee representation and of management-initiated practices, they still propose a convincing depiction of the overall.

Following Machin and Wood [2005], which pointed out the limits of studies only using synthetic indicators of HRM practices at work (measuring their number or intensity), we deliberately kept the whole scale of the practices simultaneously available in the surveys. These variables correspond to the two types of management-initiated practices, which a priori are likely to be in competition with representative institutions (concerning either employee participation or individualisation techniques). We thus distinguish the practices related to collective expression (‘voice’), that is to say direct methods for communication, and the ones related to the development of individualised devices for employment relation.

In the following, under the generic term “participative practices”, we gather:

- ✓ generalised diffusion of newsletters or firm newspaper;
- ✓ existence of suggestion boxes or schemes;
- ✓ existence of quality circles or problem solving groups;
- ✓ existence of regular staff meetings (GB) or expression groups (Fr);

- ✓ existence of regular team briefings (GB) or workforce meetings (Fr).

The individualisation variables are:

- ✓ existence of annual appraisals, for some or all employees;
- ✓ payment by individual results, for some or all employees.

The representation structures are described as follows:

- ✓ the existence of an union representative in the workplace (designated in France as “*délégués syndicaux*”, recognised or not in Great Britain), with for some analyses a distinction according to the existence of union members (in case of a lack of union representative) and to the level of union rates (high or low) otherwise;
- ✓ The existence of a non union representative (GB) and the majority list at the last professional election, including lists presented by unions (France);
- ✓ The existence of a work council (France) or a joint consultative committee (GB), with a distinction in the former case between unionised and non unionised ones.

3.2. Methods for analysis

Sticking to our hypotheses (see 2.), the results that are shown below follow a deliberate plan. In the first part (section 4.1), we examine comparative figures corresponding to the development of HRM practices and employee representatives' respective presence in British and French workplaces. Note that these presences are stated by employer declaration. Then, we test our first hypothesis with an analysis of the evolution of the correlation between these two sets of indicators, each of them computed in a categorical variable summarizing all the different combinations respectively of HRM practices and of institutions for employee representation. In order to take into account the composition effect linked to size and sector, we also estimate the odd ratios between union presence (respectively Joint Consultative Committee / Work Council) and the different HRM practices at each date and in each country. We interpret positive odds ratios as indicating rather coexistence (or simultaneous absence) than exclusion of these practices and structures; and an increasing of these statistics throughout the successive cross-sections will be interpreted as an increasing relationship, size and activity still being equal otherwise. As for the direct testing of the 'direct substitution' hypothesis, we carried on an exploratory analysis using the 1998-2004 REPONSE panel, in order to determine if the setting up of representative institutions and of HRM practices happens in a correlative, anti-correlative or independent process.

The second part (section 4.2) gets into employee perceptions on such representative and management techniques. We have thus modelled the workers' answers to a series of questions, which belong to three distinct registers. The first register corresponds to the employer responsiveness. It is apprehended through a pair of questions, which are quite close in the WERS and REPONSE surveys: the French questionnaire interrogates employees on the behaviour of their management in case of difficulty or tension in the workplace¹⁰ (*it generally consults workers or their representatives or it doesn't*); WERS asks employees to assess *how good are managers at the workplace at seeking the views of employees or employee representatives (very good, good, neither good or poor, poor, very poor)*. The

¹⁰ In French : « En cas de tension ou de difficulté dans l'entreprise, le plus souvent la direction consulte les salariés ou les représentants du personnel pour trouver des solutions en commun ».

second register corresponds to the feeling of getting recognition for the work done. In REPOSE, the question is asked with the following formulation¹¹: “Ultimately, considering your efforts, do you think that your firm acknowledge your work at its true value?” (*strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree*). In WERS, the interviewee has to respond to the following question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the amount of involvement you have in decision-making at this workplace?” (*very satisfied, satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, dissatisfied, very dissatisfied*). This pair of questions is particularly important since the weakening mechanisms suppose to test work satisfaction in presence of employee representatives and of HRM practices. The third register refers to employee representatives’ responsiveness, with two close questions: REPOSE asks employees whether they agree (*totally, partially, partially not and totally not*) with the statement: “*employee representatives express well workers’ concerns*”¹²; WERS asks interviewees whether “unions or staff association at [the] workplace” actually “take[s] notice of members’ problems and complaints” (*strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree*).

We estimated different models, either binomial or ordinal multinomial, depending on the type of response to the question examined. We have also decided not to aggregate the British and French datasets together given the persisting differences in the wording of the questions (which led to differentiated specifications of the estimated models, amongst binomial and ordinal multinomial specifications for the dependent variable and with different independent variables)¹³. Yet, we used the same (or most comparable) set of variables in each model. As for our variables of interest, we carried on implementing the various management techniques and representative structures available. The control variables include worker’s characteristics (gender, age, union membership) and job’s socio-economic position, but also workplace features (see Annex): beside the traditional dimensions like size and sector, we used some additional variables like belonging to a mono- versus multi-workplaces company, to a group or to a listed company; some information on the economic activity of the workplace are also used, such as the trend of growth or decline of the activity and the domestic or international dimension of the market. Lastly, the workforce composition is taken into account through the gendered socio-economic structure of the workplace.

Before analysing workers’ perceptions, we shall thus examine the way managerial devices and representative structures have evolved in the last fifteen years.

4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

4.1. Coexistence rather than exclusion between HRM practices and representative structures, both in France and Great Britain

In France, except expression groups – which are regressing –, each of the ‘Human Resource Management’ (HRM) practices listed has experienced a trend in the diffusion amongst

¹¹ In French : « Au final, compte tenu des efforts que vous faites, estimez-vous que l’entreprise reconnaît votre travail à sa juste valeur ? ».

¹² In French : « Les représentants du personnel traduisent bien les aspirations des salariés ».

¹³ The effect of a country dummy might as well correspond to national specificity of the statistical devices (particularly the formulation of the questions asked in the surveys) as to specific features of the French or British employment relations system. The comparison of the effects of the other variables might also be affected. Hence the successive one-to-one comparisons of findings issued from similar analyses (preserving the internal coherence of each analysis).

establishments of more than 50 employees (*table 1*) from 1992 to 2004. This tendency doesn't follow a linear development: the diffusion of these practices is generally much stronger between 1992 and 1998, than between 1998 and 2004. This first statement is conform to the state of knowledge relating to the organisational and working conditions changes in the last two decades: after a first period of acute changes, responsible for the increasing of workload, the latest period has marked time in France, leading to a stabilisation of the intensification phenomena (Bué et al. [2007]).

In Great Britain, the trend is quite similar: uniform growth of all the HRM devices listed, development that has already been described by Kerlsey et al. [2006], Forth and Millward [2002]. Moreover, the diffusion of HRM practices in Great-Britain occurred at a more regular pace than in France, as no specific acceleration is observable between 1990 and 1998. Though progressing between 1990 and 2004, 'quality circles and problem solving groups' are appreciably declining in the last period, which might be the sign of an inversion in the relish of some firms toward these practices or only be the consequence of a changing of the wording in the questionnaire (see note under table 1).

In the case of Great Britain, however, the evolutions shouldn't be over-interpreted given the fact that some important changes occurred in the wording of the WIRS/WERS surveys between 1990 and 2004. Despite all these limits, considering the trends and variations recorded here, the robustness of our main conclusions is satisfactory.

A noteworthy development in the French case – this time because of its regularity – concerns annual appraisals (generalised for all employees). The growing use of annual appraisals is partly benefiting from compulsory dispositions (since 2004) concerning professional training, since those annual meetings between employees and employers are an adapted framework to address such issues¹⁴. Either acute or slight, the diffusion of HRM practices witnesses the extensive presence of techniques that aim to collect, reformulate and eventually transmit information. In the case of annual appraisals, it is also, and even more, the sign of the trend towards individualised employment relations in the workplace.

Indeed, another striking development in France is the significantly widening use of individualised pay devices (such as performance-related pay under individual evaluation). In 2004, almost three over four establishments of 50 employees and more have adopted such a device for some or for all of their employees. This proportion is much higher than in Great Britain, where one over four establishments only is concerned. This observation runs against some stereotypes about the French and British economies, the first supposedly being of a more collectivist kind and the second being characterised by its degree of individualisation and its market-related regulation (Cf. Marsden, Belfield, Benhamou [forthcoming]).

Apart from such individualised pay devices, British workplaces appear in 2004 to make a greater use of most of the HRM practices listed, no matter how fast the development of these participative devices has been in France. In spite of the differences in the wording of these questions in WERS REPOSE, they are related to identical and quite identifiable practices. And regarding these questions, only 'quality circles and problems solving groups' are more often settled in French establishments (55.5%) than in British ones (36.7%). As it was already the case in the past, Great Britain – as the United States – undeniably continues to be on a leading position in Europe concerning management techniques.

¹⁴ More precisely, one should add that these compulsory dispositions are the transcription within the law of spontaneous practices that were preliminarily formalised in a national collective agreement. The annual appraisals are a good example in France of the diffusion of innovative practices in a bottom-up process, ending up with new compulsory dispositions.

Table 1: Incidence of HRM practices

	Great Britain			France			
	1990	1998	2004	1992	1998	2004	
Participative practices							
Firm newspaper, newsletters	45.7	53.6	63.8	48.1	49.2	53.5	
Suggestion boxes or schemes	29.1	38.0	42.1	23.2	27.0	25.8	
Quality circles, problems solving groups	32.2	44.1	36.7 ^π	38.1	56.3	55.5	
Staff meeting (GB) // Expression group (Fr)	43.2	45.7	78.9 ^α	29.5	21.6	25.6	
Team briefing (GB) // Workforce meeting (Fr)	45.9	55.4 (88.0) ^β	75.7 (89.3) ^β	75.6	79.8	84.4	
Individualisation variables							
Annual appraisal	For all	20.3 ^γ	51.2	66.3	35.8	40.7	53.0
	For some	7.8 ^γ	33.6	22.9	40.4	34.1	33.9
Payment by individual results	For all	9.1 ^δ	13.6	14.8	25.1	38.6	44.1
	For some	25.3 ^δ	4.0	9.5	31.0	26.1	29.9
Sample size	1 256	1 046	947	1 744	2 256	2 265	

Sources: GB – WIRS 1990, WERS 1998 and 2004; France – REPONSE 1992-1993, 1998-1999 and 2004-2005.

Field: Establishments with 50+ employees, private sector.

Note: Frequencies are italicized when doubts occur about their comparability within time. (^α) In 1990 and in 1998, ‘staff meeting’ refers to regular meetings with “entire workforce present”, as the 2004 WERS edition softens the formulation by including a wider range of meetings – “between senior managers and the whole workforce (either altogether or group by group)”. (^β) For comparability reasons with WIRS 1990, ‘Team briefing’ in Great Britain has to be on a monthly basis at least (which doesn’t match with the French formulation). The frequencies of the ‘team briefings’ without any mention of the periodicity are put between brackets. (^{γ, δ}) The items relating to appraisal and payment policies have consequently evolved between WIRS 1990 and both WERS 1998-2004: the two last editions of the survey distinguish the occupational groups potentially concerned. ‘For all’ means that some professionals (managers, senior officials and any professional occupations) and some non-professionals (technical, administrative, skilled or non-skilled occupations) are concerned. ‘For some’ corresponds to establishments with one only of these two groups concerned. This distinction is impossible to settle in 1990 for annual appraisal: the range of exposure of the employees to this practice is addressed, once the presence of this device is stated, “for all employees” or “just some”. (^π) In 2004, the wording concerning ‘quality circles’ is altered to focus on groups of non-managerial employees (see Kersley et al. [2006] for discussion)

Simultaneously of the diffusion of HRM techniques, all of the representative institutions have experienced a continuous and regular diffusion amongst French establishments of more than 50 employees (*table 2A*): union delegates, elected representatives on an unionised list, either within work councils or without, are progressing. Non-unionised elected representatives are the only ones to regress in the period. These findings are conform to the state of knowledge concerning the latest development of trade unions: an implantation policy conceived in the 90’s that aimed to compensate the decreasing number of members. The non-unionised lists decline is in this context the mechanical consequence of this policy, given the way professional elections are organised in France. This implantation policy succeeded in stopping the decline, but led to an institutionalisation of their function (Amossé, Pignoni [2006]).

The situation in Great Britain is quite different: in accordance to union density that has continued to slow down in the recent years, the presence of recognised union representatives is declining. However, the decline is slower between 1998 and 2004 than in the first period, and is specific to the private sector (Kersley et al. [2006]). Following a different trend, non-union representatives are progressing within the British establishments of 50 employees and more. Despite the coming into effect in June 2000 of a new statutory procedure in the United Kingdom (Employment Relations Act 1999), the joint consultative committees – that should have partly benefited from these dispositions – are slightly regressing between 1998 and 2004. With members alternatively elected by employees or designated by the company or the trade

unions, this representative institution remains extremely heterogeneous: from pro-active committees dealing with employees' issues to boards held by management staff, all the configurations are conceivable. Their impact on the employment relations is thus difficult to predict.

Table 2: Incidence of representative structures

	2A – France			2B – Great Britain			
	1992	1998	2004	1990	1998	2004	
Union delegate	48.4	55.5	61.2				
Majority list on the last professional elections ^ε				Recognised union representative	34.4 ^ζ	26.6	22.7
CFDT							
CGT	16.5	17.2	19.1				
FO	9.0	8.4	9.4	Non-union representative	12.0	15.5	22.4
CFTC	2.4	2.3	3.8				
CGC	1.8	0.8	2.3				
Other union	4.3	4.8	2.6	Joint consultative committee	29.9 ^η	40.8	36.0
Non union	41.9	37.1	35.8				
Work council	73.9	78.5	80.0				
Elected representative	72.8	80.2	87.0				
Sample size	1 744	2 256	2 265	Sample size	1 256	1 046	947

Sources: GB – WIRS 1990, WERS 1998 and 2004; France – REPONSE 1992-1993, 1998-1999 and 2004-2005.

Field: Establishments with 50+ employees, private sector.

Note: (^ε) In France, the majority lists sometimes combine two or more trade unions in order to get elected. These cases are taken into account in REPONSE 1998-1999 and 2004-2005, but unfortunately not in REPONSE 1992-1993. (^ζ) The question in WERS 1990 mixes up recognised and non-recognised unions, without distinguishing them. The 1990 frequency shown overestimates the presence of recognised union representatives. (^η) The formulation on 'joint consultative committees' is much restrictive in WIRS 1990 than in WERS 1998 and 2004.

The much wider presence of representative institutions in France is conform to the stereotype of a country regulated by collective dispositions. One should not forget that it is also the result of a system quite tightly constrained by the legal framework. The other striking difference with Great Britain in this matter is the pluralism of trade unions: the French employment relations system is structured around five confederated unions and a couple of autonomous ones, often coexisting within the same workplaces. Despite this genuine multiplicity, two organisations are dominating the others: CGT and CFDT.

Table 3: Two measures for the intensity of the relationship between HRM practices and representative structures

	Great Britain			France		
	1990	1998	2004	1992	1998	2004
Contingency coefficient	0.64	0.74	0.70	0.62	0.68	0.67
Cramer's V	0.32	0.41	0.38	0.30	0.35	0.34

Sources: GB – WIRS 1990, WERS 1998 and 2004; France – REPONSE 1992-1993, 1998-1999 and 2004-2005.

Note: In WERS and REPONSE, two nominal variables are carried out that sum up **all** the observable combinations of the HRM practices and the representative structures – that is to say 'Firm newspaper, newsletters', 'Suggestion boxes or schemes', 'Quality circles', 'Staff meeting' (GB) or 'Expression group' (Fr), 'Team briefing' (GB) or 'Workforce meeting' (Fr) on the one hand and presence of an union representative, of a joint consultative committee (GB) or a work council (Fr), of a non-union representative (GB) or a representative appointed at the last professional elections on an non-unionised list (Fr). The correlation between these two variables is measurable by the 'Contingency coefficient' and 'Cramer's V' statistics, which both vary between 0 (strict independency) and 1 (identity of the variables).

The analysis of the correlation factors between HRM practices and representative structures in France and in Great Britain, from 1990-92 to 2004, confirms the strength of the

association between HRM practices and representative structures: both the 'Contingency coefficient' and 'Cramer's V' measures reveal a strong relationship between them (table 3). This statistical link is even strengthening between 1990-92 and 2004, with a peak in 1998, although such changes have to be tested to assess their significance.

Moreover, when considered one by one, most of the associations are positive (estimations not shown here). And it is still often the case size and activity being equal otherwise. In 2004, the relationships between HRM practices and presence of union representatives or joint consultative committees within workplaces are almost never significantly negative in Great Britain (Tables 4a and 4b): the only negative estimates concern the link between union presence and individualisation variables in 1990 and 1998; they are systematically positive for the participative practices and the presence of a Joint Consultative Committee (JCC). Concerning individualisation variables, a strong association between generalised annual appraisal and the presence of JCC (respectively 1.02 in 2004 and 1.13 in 1998) is observed, which is related to the very low proportion of establishments without appraisal procedures when JCC are present. In Great Britain, the establishments of more than 50 employees without appraisals are quite rare and very specific: most of the time, they don't have any employee representation nor HRM practices at all.

In France, the situation is slightly different for Work Councils: most of the significant coefficients are negative, notably concerning expression groups and workforce meetings. These coefficients may be the sign of a substitution strategy in some establishments of their Work Councils by such a participative practice: in the few establishments without work councils (one over five), expression group and workforce briefing are more common – even when size and activity *are equal otherwise*. Concerning the presence of an Union representative, size and activity also being equal otherwise, the relationship with HRM practices are more often significantly positive and no negative effect is observed. As in Great Britain, only positive associations are observed in 2004 in France between the presence of an Union representative and the HRM practices.

From 1990-92 to 2004, changes in these relationships show no obvious direction in Great Britain. In France though, positive or negative, the associations are slightly increasing over the years (even if the differences aren't significant). These relationships globally show the rather robust coexistence of HRM practices and representative structures both in France and in Great Britain. The changes concerning these practices and structures are working together, within the same workplaces – rather than one at the expense of the other. The pieces of evidence for a substitution mechanism between managerial techniques and representative regimes are quite rare in France and completely missing in Great Britain. This statement seems also to be confirmed on both WERS and REPONSE 1998-2004 panels (estimates not shown here), which means that the phenomena is not only the outcome of establishments ageing or the specificities of younger establishments.

These elements together support $H_{1/F}$ hypothesis and contradict $H_{1/GB}$: both in France and in Great Britain, HRM practices and representative structures rather coexist than expel one another. Moreover, we have identified a greater number of significant relationships in Great Britain than in France. HRM practices and representative structures are actually more likely to follow independent decision patterns in France, which confirms $H_{1/F-GB}$ hypothesis.

Table 4: Statistical estimates of the relationship between HRM practices and the presence of employee representatives

		Great Britain			France		
		1990	1998	2004	1992	1998	2004
Table 4a: Presence of an union representative							
Firm newspaper, newsletters		-0.06 (0.14)	0.74*** (0.17)	0.17 (0.17)	0.40*** (0.12)	0.55*** (0.11)	0.68*** (0.12)
Suggestion boxes or schemes		0.12 (0.13)	0.41*** (0.16)	0.13 (0.15)	0.04 (0.13)	0.11 (0.11)	0.02 (0.13)
Quality circles, problems solving groups		-0.17 (0.13)	0.22 (0.15)	0.4***^z (0.16)	0.02 (0.11)	0.11 (0.1)	0.21* (0.12)
Staff meeting (GB) // Expression group (Fr)		-0.05 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.15)	<i>0.04^a</i> (0.19)	0.15 (0.12)	0.22* (0.12)	0.12 (0.13)
Team briefing (GB) // Workforce meeting (Fr)		-0.01 (0.13)	0.28*^β (0.15)	<i>-0.01^β</i> (0.18)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.31** (0.13)	0.34** (0.16)
Annual appraisal	For some	<i>-0.06^γ</i> (0.20)	0.18 (0.25)	0.85*** (0.33)	0.22 (0.14)	0.16 (0.14)	0.31 (0.19)
	For all	-0.4***^γ (0.15)	-0.20 (0.25)	0.08 (0.31)	0.04 (0.15)	0.06 (0.14)	0.45** (0.19)
Payment by individual results	For some	<i>0.18^δ</i> (0.14)	-0.12 (0.38)	0.17 (0.25)	0.09 (0.13)	0.03 (0.14)	0.01 (0.17)
	For all	-0.35*^δ (0.20)	-0.4* (0.20)	-0.33 (0.20)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.03 (0.16)
Tables 4b: Presence of a joint consultative committee (GB) / a work council (Fr)							
Firm newspaper, newsletters		0.54*** (0.14)	0.64*** (0.15)	0.35** (0.16)	0.20 (0.12)	0.003 (0.15)	0.20 (0.14)
Suggestion boxes or schemes		0.58*** (0.13)	0.41*** (0.14)	0.52*** (0.15)	0.11 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.16)	0.01 (0.16)
Quality circles, problems solving groups		0.35*** (0.13)	0.64*** (0.13)	0.5***^z (0.15)	-0.12 (0.12)	0.002 (0.15)	0.26* (0.14)
Staff meeting (GB) // Expression group (Fr)		0.49*** (0.12)	0.46*** (0.13)	0.4***^a (0.18)	-0.22* (0.12)	-0.29* (0.16)	-0.35** (0.15)
Team briefing (GB) // Workforce meeting (Fr)		0.44*** (0.13)	0.26**^β (0.13)	0.6***^β (0.18)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.38* (0.19)	0.38** (0.18)
Annual appraisal	For some	<i>0.07^γ</i> (0.2)	0.65*** (0.23)	0.48 (0.31)	0.07 (0.15)	0.08 (0.2)	0.01 (0.24)
	For all	<i>0.05^γ</i> (0.15)	1.13*** (0.23)	1.02*** (0.3)	0.001 (0.16)	-0.45** (0.19)	-0.09 (0.23)
Payment by individual results	For some	<i>0.08^δ</i> (0.14)	0.01 (0.34)	-0.12 (0.25)	0.25* (0.14)	-0.25 (0.19)	-0.1 (0.2)
	For all	<i>-0.07^δ</i> (0.20)	0.46** (0.19)	0.04 (0.19)	0.22 (0.15)	0.28 (0.19)	0.16 (0.19)

Sources: GB – WIRS 1990, WERS 1998 and 2004; France – REPOSE 1992-1993, 1998-1999 and 2004-2005.

Note: See 'Note' under table 1. These coefficients are estimated separately in logistic regressions where the presence of an Union representative or of a Joint Consultative Committee (GB) / a Work Council (Fr) depends on one of the HRM practices listed, plus a few characteristics of the workplace (namely its size and activity). For 'annual appraisal' and 'payment by individual results', both 'For Some' and 'For All' variables are computed together, with 'None' as the reference.

4.2. H₂ : From the employee point of view, no evidence for a mutual weakening of HRM practices and representative structures

Beside the ongoing practices and structures, which can be purely formal, the issue of the development of the social regulation instruments in the French and British workplaces may be now formulated in terms of efficiency or efficacy, either for the employer (through the consequences on the economic performance for example) or for the workers. We focus here on this last question and try to adopt the workers' point of view to understand the way representative structures and management practices are interacting. The question raised addresses the way workers perceive the managers' and employee representatives' responsiveness depending on whether there is (or not) such structures or practices in the place.

The results, shown in *table 5*, suggest some general comments. First, they reveal the difficulty of modelling workers' perception on work: whatever dependent variable is examined, the percentage of concordant pairs (used classically as an indicator of the predictability of the model) is never above 62%, which is rather low given the number of variables used. It may be explained by the way the questions of perception are determined by individual factors, most often unobserved, even unobservable. Besides, it is not a surprise to state that individual characteristics are more explanatory than the workplace features.

Concerning individual characteristics (see *Annex*), one observes the importance of the socio-economic position in Britain and even more in France to explain workers' perception: many British workers in intermediary position think that their employer fail in gathering their views whereas, in both countries, manager and professionals have faith in employer consultation abilities; in the same time, French higher grade professional are more often mistrusting their representatives when it comes to properly express their concerns. Representation and consultation have obviously still something to do with some "*lutte des classes*" (class struggle), especially in France, where unionism is still strongly related to blue collar workers, whereas, whatever their socio-economic positions, there are no significant differences amongst employee perceptions on the responsiveness of their representatives in Great Britain.

Besides, whereas gender hasn't any significant effects – except for the management's responsiveness in Great Britain, which is more often perceived by women than by men –, the coefficients relative to age show significant effects, but with different signs in the two countries: the older the more British workers seem to mistrust both their employer and their representatives; on the contrary, older workers express a more consensual opinion on their employer in France. This difference could be interpreted in terms of social position of the different generations in the two countries: where older ones have endured some political turbulences under Margaret Thatcher's government in Britain, younger have experienced a more comfortable economic period while entering the labour market; on the contrary, younger generations have had some structural difficulties to make their own place in the French economy, where older ones still occupy most of the best positions.

Dealing now with the features of the workplaces (again see *Annex*), one can notice the deep differences concerning the effects of the sector variables on the way employers are perceived. If observed in both countries, these effects are most of the time opposite: in Great Britain, employers' responsiveness is stronger in education, health and social work as in manufactures of food products and beverages and lower in financial intermediation and real estate; in France, it is the case respectively in construction and in transport. Trade, where

workers less often perceive their manager as consulting them or their representatives, is one of the only sectors with similar effects in both countries. The sector effect may thus less refer to the differences of work organisation among the economic activities (which are similar in France and Great Britain) than to different political structuring among the branches (which are there rather different).

The workforce structure plays also a non negligible role, but this time comparable in the two countries, with notably the presence of executive women which are positively correlated with manager and representatives perceived as more responsive. On the contrary, the size variables, which strongly determined the presence – or the absence – of managerial devices and representative structures do not seem to influence largely workers' perception on the effectiveness and the quality of social dialogue.

Concerning our variables of interest here, the regressions show a very clear impact of the HRM practices on the probability of the British workers to declare being consulted by their direction. All of the participative variables (except 'Team briefing'), as well as the individualisation variables have a positive impact (first column of table 5). But this rarely leads to a greater satisfaction at work (second column): only 'Staff meeting' and 'payment by individual results' keep a significant impact on the feeling of being rewarded. More of a formal kind, the HRM practices listed increase the perception of a dialog-oriented direction, without improving concretely employee satisfaction. These managerial practices have no negative effects on the legitimacy of the employee representatives (third column): except 'payment by results', none of these practices breaks up the employee opinion on the efficacy of their representatives. And this supports our hypothesis $H_{2a/GB}$.

Concerning the representative structures in Great-Britain, the presence of an Union (either recognised or not) increases the feeling to have been consulted. The impact is even stronger in the case of an Union representative in an establishment of low union density. But this link is absent when considering the feeling of being rewarded or correctly represented. The results are even worse for Joint Consultative Committee: when non-unionised, its settlement is negatively correlated with consultation and satisfaction at work. This might be the sign of unfaithful institutions at the hands of the direction. And these results do show greater management responsiveness with 'real' institutions of employee representation, which is coherent with our $H_{2b/GB}$ hypothesis.

In France, the link between HRM practices and the employee perceptions are much weaker than in Great Britain. Moreover, when significant, the sign of the impacts on consultation varies from negative ('quality circles') to positive ('firm newspaper'). Regarding to representatives' responsiveness, effects are also weak (most often non significant) and either positive ('workforce meeting') or negative ('suggestion boxes'). The $H_{2a/F}$ hypothesis of a weakening of management with representatives is thus not clearly validated.

Concerning the employee representation, no significant difference between institutions is observed, probably because of the statutory provisions that most of the time assure their existence within the workplace and lead both to some distance with institutions and confusion between mandates from workers' point of view. All this supports our hypothesis $H_{2/F-GB}$.

The weaker responsiveness of employee representatives and managers in France does not mean that there is no effect at all of HRM practices and employee representation on workers' perceptions. Actually, the presence of Union representatives however has a strong impact on the employee consultation: independent of the union density, the Union representatives assure a better dialog between employer and workers within the workplace. We register a particularly positive effect of the CFTC lists at the professional elections, which may be the

sign of the greater implantation of this Union in some specifically consensual establishments (linked to its Christian reformism heritage).

Table 5: Employee perception on the effectiveness of HRM practices and their representation in 2004 ⁹

The employees declare that...	Great-Britain			France		
	they are consulted by the management	they are rewarded for their efforts	reps take notice of their concerns [±]	they are consulted by the management	they are rewarded for their efforts	reps take notice of their concerns [±]
<i>HRM practices</i>						
Firm newspaper, newsletters	0.11* (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)
Suggestion boxes or schemes	0.11** (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.14** (0.06)
Quality circles, problems solving groups	0.14*** (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)
Staff meeting (GB) // Expression group (Fr)	0.14** (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)
Team briefing (GB) // Workforce meeting (Fr)	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.12 (0.08)	0.1 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	0.18* (0.09)
Annual appraisal	For some	0.13 (0.1)	0.02 (0.1)	0.14 (0.13)	0.11 (0.11)	0.22** (0.09)
	For all	0.25** (0.1)	0.12 (0.1)	0.07 (0.13)	0.24** (0.11)	0.25*** (0.09)
Payment by individual results	For some	-0.02 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.19* (0.1)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)
	For all	0.25*** (0.07)	0.14** (0.07)	0.01 (0.09)	0.1 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)
<i>Representative structures</i>						
Presence of an Union representative (GB) / delegate (Fr)						
No Union and no union member ^σ	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
No Union but still union members ^σ	0.17** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.07)		0.24** (0.12)	0.06 (0.11)	
Union with a low membership rate ^σ	0.27** (0.13)	0.17 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.15)	0.21* (0.11)	0.17* (0.1)	-0.11 (0.1)
Union with a high membership rate ^σ	0.05 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.1)	0.29*** (0.11)	0.14 (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)
Non union representative (GB)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.07)			
Joint consultative committee (GB)						
– non-unionised	-0.24*** (0.07)	-0.26*** (0.07)	0.07 (0.1)			
– unionised	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)			
Majority list at the last professional elections (Fr)						
No election				Ref	Ref	Ref
CFDT				0.16* (0.09)	-0.19** (0.08)	-0.05 (0.1)
CGC				-0.05 (0.14)	-0.28** (0.13)	-0.16 (0.15)
CFTC				0.37*** (0.13)	0.19 (0.12)	0.18 (0.14)

CGT				0.17* (0.09)	-0.22*** (0.08)	0.09 (0.1)
FO				0.14 (0.1)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.11)
Other unions				0.01 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.15)
Non unionised list				-0.11 (0.1)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.12)
Sample size	8 968	8 941	4 708	6 128	6 128	5 931

([†]) The coefficients in these two columns are estimated on the sub-sample of the workplaces actually provided with employee representatives (either unionised or not).

([°]) In order to insure the comparisons between these test statistics (standard-error and p-value), for each pair of models (either consultation, reward or Rep responsiveness), the respective WERS and REPOSE total weightings are adjusted to the lower value (i.e. 6.128 for consultation and reward, 4.708 for Rep responsiveness).

([°]) In Great-Britain, by 'Union', we mean: presence at the workplace of a recognised union representative. Hence the 'No Union but some union members' cases very often correspond to workplaces without any recognised union representative, but with one or several non-recognised union representatives and employees that are members of this (these) union(s).

These results invalidate partly our hypothesis $H_{2b/F}$, which must nonetheless be further discussed. Actually, the link between of union presence and HRM practices' effectiveness has to be nuanced by the coefficient corresponding to the individual union membership: in France (hence not always significantly) as in Great Britain, unionised workers are more sceptical about management responsiveness and less satisfied at work whereas they do express their faith in their representatives' responsiveness. According to this, unions influence positively the way management consults workers, but also contribute – through their members – to express some criticisms against it.

One must also keep this in mind when interpreting the coefficients corresponding to the negative link between the presence of majority lists of CFDT, CGT and CGC and the employee satisfaction. Of course, these figures have to be read carefully: it is really rare that unions have the majority of votes at a professional scrutiny without having a representative in the workplace, so that the coefficients corresponding to 'union with a low membership' (0.17*) or 'union with a high membership' (0.14) must be added to the previous ones. But these results indicate that unions, which are presented as alternatives to *exit* for workers, contribute to build collective grievances in workplaces (Freeman and Medoff [1984]).

5. CONCLUSION - DISCUSSION

These empirical results witness no clear evidence concerning a substitution (direct or indirect) between institutions of employee representation and HRM practices. In France, we observe a simultaneous but not exclusive development of managerial devices and representative structures in workplaces of more than 50 employees since the beginning of the 90's. At the same time, the relationship between these institutions and techniques remains strong in a British context, while unions carry on declining. We also show that there wasn't any real weakening either of employee representatives by HRM practices, or of management by unions or joint consultative committees. Our results even show some cases of mutual strengthening of these devices and institutions. Regarding now our hypotheses, most of them are supported by the findings presented here. Though, in Great Britain, we have found pieces of evidence rather for the coexistence of employee representation and HRM practices, than

for exclusion as expected ($H_{1/GB}$). This leads us to put into perspective the idea that employee representation and HRM practices might be in competition in employers' mind. Especially when considering the $H_{2a/GB}$ and $H_{2b/GB}$ hypotheses, which the mutual benefits of their coexistence in Great Britain. In France, the picture is quite different: while employee representation and HRM practices are actually coexisting ($H_{1/F}$), the respective responsiveness of these structures and techniques appears one another quite independent: in France, there isn't any clear direction in the effects of HRM practices on employee representation responsiveness ($H_{2a/F}$) and of employee representation on HRM practices responsiveness ($H_{2b/F}$).

Overview of the results

'Raw' hypotheses	Translation of the hypotheses according to the national contexts		
	France	Great Britain	Anglo-French comparison
H₁: Direct substitution			
Exclusion vs. coexistence of HRM practices and employee representation structures	$H_{1/F}$: confirmed	$H_{1/GB}$: invalidated	$H_{1/F-GB}$: confirmed
H₂: Indirect substitution			
H_{2a} : Weakening of the employee representation responsiveness in presence of HRM practices?	$H_{2a/F}$: uncertain	$H_{2a/GB}$ & $H_{2b/GB}$: both confirmed	$H_{2/F-GB}$: confirmed
H_{2b} : Weakening of the HRM practices responsiveness in presence of employee representatives?	$H_{2b/F}$: uncertain		

Yet, worker perceptions on their representatives' and managers' responsiveness mostly reveal the weakness of the differences between these perceptions whether such practices and/or structures are present or not in the workplace both in Great Britain and in France. If, as we discussed it earlier in this paper, a difference in the nature or objectives between employee representation and management exists, such a difference isn't clearly observable through employee declarations concerning the efficiency and the quality of social dialogue in the workplace.

5.1. Limits

Before referring to the further perspectives opened by these findings, we propose to list some limits of our approach, restricting the empirical investigations. First of all, one must keep in mind the differences of wordings and questioning of the different surveys used. The comparison between managerial techniques or representative structures, which meaning has changed over time, is already quite delicate. It is even more delicate when questions aren't exactly identical. Moreover, differences are here analysed in two different national contexts, with a differentiated social structuring of their industrial and employment relations systems. Given these difficulties, which are likely to be overcome (see Coutrot [1998], which brought light on the relevance and benefits of such bi-national studies), we've endeavoured to present as precisely as possible the implemented variables and the corresponding findings. However, caution is needed while reading and interpreting the results of our statistical investigations, as they only are a partial response to the complexity of the 'substitution vs. complementarity' issue.

The results showed here all come from descriptive models in which the causality of the effects is never made clear. For example, from the employee point of view, suggestion boxes

are associated in France with a lower responsiveness of employee representatives and non-unionised Joint Consultative Committees in Great Britain are related to employers that consult specifically less their employees and representatives; both relationships shouldn't be interpreted too simplistically as causal relations: there is no evidence that suggestion boxes on the one hand and non-union JCC on the other hand respectively "cause" such representatives' and employers' unresponsiveness. Indeed, these structures might only reveal the favourable or unfavourable context that explains their presence, without being identifiable with the observable variables available in the survey: on the one hand, suggestion boxes might significantly more often be settled in French workplaces where employee representatives are perceived as less responsive; in Great Britain on the other hand, the presence of non-union representatives might take its whole sense in the establishments experiencing social conflicts, hence tenuous relations between employees, representatives and employers. The potential endogeneity of these phenomena and the inverse causality of these social mechanisms haven't been taken into account here, as convincing instruments to do so are lacking. However, this has to be kept in mind when interpreting our results.

Afterwards, another question arises challenging the relevance of an approach aiming to separate effects, to identify "pure" associations (i.e. "all else being equal otherwise") between a given managerial technique or representative institution and employee perception. It might be necessary to go past such an approach by identifying the multi-dimensional configurations perceived by the employees. The difficulties we encounter while bringing to light the "effects" of these instruments on behalf of the declarations of the employees might be the consequence of the fickleness of the effect of a HRM technique or an employee representative according to the absence and/or presence of other HRM practices or representative structures. In this perspective, one should partly renounce to the analytic approach proposed here and look for a synthetic approach, trying to identify the regulation systems at stake and even to integrate them in a description in terms of socio-productive conventions (also including the organisational devices, compensation policies and carrier management). This is the approach followed by Amossé and Coutrot *in* Amossé, Bloch-London and Wolff [forthcoming].

For all these reasons, our results should be confronted to other studies based on other methodological approaches: fieldwork monographs of establishments (from direct observations) and in-depth interviews with senior managers and employee representatives at stake. The hypothesis of a strong and growing complementarity of managerial devices and representative structures in France (both serving differentiated purposes: setting up information channels for employers in the first case, employee voice in the second) could be re-examined with new materials. The issue of the observable distance between employees and both their employers and representatives is also a main concern.

5.2. Perspectives

Restating existing studies based on Great Britain (particularly Machin and Wood [2005]), our findings reinforce the idea that the American situation is more of an exception than the rule: despite an extremely favourable context for union liquidation and for their replacement by management-initiated techniques, both the French and British situations didn't follow the American development. Besides, there might even be evidences in the United-States for some kind of union revival in the last ten years. Moreover given the papers that put the stress on the rather positive opinions that most employers have toward employee representatives in Great Britain and in France (Kersley et al. [2006], Amossé [2006]), one might conclude that

the aversion toward union mustn't be as generalised as often presented, mostly in big workplaces or firms.

Considering all this, the continuous declining of individual membership is all the most intriguing. The differences in employment relations systems aren't sufficient to clear this statement, since the same declining is recorded in most countries. Likewise, the presumed reluctance of employers toward employee representatives is obviously not enough. More convincing features can be put forward: the greater difficulties met by trade unions while facing employee and firm demography; and most of all the global development of a variety of capitalism with the flexibilisation of the employment conditions as a response to the increasing pressure exerted by global competition. The importance of the last factor is assessed by the extremely low membership rates amongst flexible populations – notably interim or fixed-term contracts (Amossé, Pignoni [2006]; Kersley et al. [2006]).

Our findings also witness the overall weakness of both HRM practices and representative structures in giving satisfaction to employee expectations. The flexibilisation of the employment conditions might indeed significantly cause the weakening of the effectiveness of these practices and structures: as Amossé [2006] pointed it in the French context, employee behaviour reveals not only strong expectancies toward both their employers and representatives but also a significant dissatisfaction regarding their concrete functioning, perceived as disconnected from actual concerns. The weakness of the relationship between formal institutions (settled either by employers or employee representatives) and employee perceptions is striking. At a time when the issue of the reform of the democratic bases for employee representation incidentally arises¹⁵, the development of management-initiated techniques (as well as the issue of the employer organisations, most of the time in a dead angle) should be also taken into consideration, since they obviously are playing a role in this matter. As indicated by da Costa [2007], reconsidering the issues related to industrial democracy within workplaces and addressed at the end of the 70's (even if in another economic context) might in this perspective be fruitful.

Contrary to the common belief that announces unions' death and their replacement by management techniques, institutions for employee representation carries on being present in French and British workplaces. Moreover, they often exist in parallel to HRM practices and play a specific role, which such practices failed to assume. The characteristics of such a coexistence remain undetermined: are they complementary, one benefiting from the other? Or does the need for employee representation benefit from negative side effects of HRM practices (individual strategies at the expense of collective goals, unspoken pressure and stress)? However, our findings invalidate the 'substitution' theory and reason in favour of the hypothesis that employee representation is a contemporary concern.

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¹⁵ See notably in France the announced reform of the criteria for union representativity and in Great-Britain the implementation of the European Directive for employee representation and participation.

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ANNEX:

Employee perception on the effectiveness of HRM practices and their representation in 2004 (control variables)

	Great Britain			France		
	Employers consult	Reward	well- represented	Employers consult	Reward	well- represented
Individual features						
Gender						
Woman	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Man	-0,10* (0,06)	0,03 (0,06)	-0,06 (0,07)	0,04 (0,07)	-0,06 (0,06)	0,05 (0,07)
Age						
Less than 30	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Between 31 and 40	-0,21*** (0,07)	-0,01 (0,07)	-0,21** (0,09)	0,12 (0,08)	-0,19*** (0,07)	-0,08 (0,08)
Between 41 and 50	-0,15** (0,07)	0,01 (0,07)	-0,23** (0,09)	0,35*** (0,08)	-0,14** (0,07)	0,04 (0,08)
More than 51	-0,08 (0,07)	0,08 (0,07)	-0,24*** (0,09)	0,23*** (0,09)	-0,12 (0,08)	0,11 (0,09)
Socio-economic position						
Great Britain						
Managers, Senior Officials and Professional Occupations	0,22** (0,09)	0,72*** (0,09)	0,27** (0,12)			
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations	-0,11 (0,1)	0,28*** (0,1)	0,07 (0,13)			
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	-0,01 (0,1)	0,23** (0,1)	0,2 (0,13)			
Skilled Trades Occupations	-0,37*** (0,11)	-0,19* (0,11)	-0,06 (0,13)			
Personal Service Occupations	0,01 (0,16)	0,04 (0,17)	0,27 (0,21)			
Sales and Customer Service Occupations	-0,28** (0,12)	-0,14 (0,12)	0,19 (0,15)			
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives Elementary Occupations	-0,36*** (0,1)	-0,28*** (0,1)	-0,07 (0,11)			
	Ref	Ref	Ref			
France						
Executive or professional (<i>cadre</i>)				0,21** (0,1)	1,26*** (0,09)	-0,46*** (0,1)
Intermediary profession (<i>profession intermédiaire</i>)				0,001 (0,08)	0,58*** (0,07)	-0,32*** (0,08)
Skilled and unskilled white collar (<i>employé</i>)				0,08 (0,1)	0,17** (0,09)	0,06 (0,1)
Skilled and unskilled blue collar (<i>ouvrier</i>)				Ref	Ref	Ref

Undeclared position	-0,26 (0,23)	-0,01 (0,23)	0,27 (0,28)	0,15 (0,18)	0,28* (0,16)	0,22 (0,18)
Union membership						
Non unionised				Ref	Ref	Ref
Unionised	-0,16*** (0,06)	-0,21*** (0,06)	0,47*** (0,07)	0,09 (0,09)	-0,31*** (0,09)	1,09*** (0,1)
Workplace features						
belonging to a listed company	-0,02 (0,06)	0,08 (0,06)	-0,13* (0,07)	0,19*** (0,06)	0,04 (0,06)	0,15** (0,06)
A single individual or family own at least 50% of the firm	0,09 (0,07)	0,11 (0,07)	-0,1 (0,09)	-0,12* (0,07)	-0,07 (0,06)	-0,02 (0,07)
Single independent establishment	0,01 (0,07)	0,12 (0,07)	0,001 (0,1)	0,01 (0,06)	-0,06 (0,05)	-0,01 (0,06)
Workplace size						
Less than 100 employees	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Between 100 and 200	0,17** (0,08)	0,20** (0,08)	-0,07 (0,12)	-0,05 (0,08)	0,001 (0,07)	-0,06 (0,09)
Between 200 and 500	0,001 (0,08)	0,02 (0,08)	0,14 (0,1)	0,02 (0,08)	-0,03 (0,08)	-0,02 (0,09)
More than 500 employees	-0,1 (0,07)	-0,01 (0,07)	0,01 (0,08)	0,02 (0,09)	-0,02 (0,08)	-0,22** (0,1)
Activity						
Manufacture of food products and beverages	0,27* (0,15)	0,19 (0,15)	-0,01 (0,17)	0,48*** (0,16)	-0,05 (0,15)	-0,04 (0,17)
Consumer goods industry	0,11 (0,14)	0,15 (0,14)	-0,12 (0,17)	0,16 (0,15)	-0,34** (0,13)	-0,13 (0,15)
Manufacture of transport equipment	0,02 (0,13)	0,06 (0,13)	0,1 (0,15)	0,24* (0,14)	-0,16 (0,12)	-0,07 (0,14)
Heavy industry, electricity, gas and water supply	0,13 (0,12)	0,05 (0,12)	-0,02 (0,15)	0,18 (0,12)	-0,12 (0,11)	0,08 (0,13)
Trade	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
Construction	0,64*** (0,16)	0,43*** (0,16)	-0,04 (0,27)	0,01 (0,17)	0,06 (0,15)	-0,14 (0,18)
Transport	-0,04 (0,14)	-0,28** (0,14)	0,06 (0,16)	-0,06 (0,14)	-0,01 (0,12)	-0,04 (0,14)
Financial intermediation, real estate	0,38*** (0,12)	0,02 (0,12)	-0,11 (0,15)	-0,22 (0,14)	-0,27** (0,13)	-0,18 (0,15)
Business activities or personal services	0,28*** (0,1)	0,001 (0,1)	0,21 (0,13)	-0,07 (0,11)	-0,11 (0,1)	0,09 (0,11)
Education, Health and social work	0,05 (0,14)	-0,04 (0,15)	0,12 (0,18)	0,63*** (0,15)	0,72*** (0,14)	0,33** (0,16)
Current state of the market						
Growing	0,01 (0,05)	-0,03 (0,05)	-0,14** (0,07)	-0,05 (0,06)	0,02 (0,06)	-0,01 (0,07)
Stable	Ref	Ref	Ref	-0,20** (0,08)	-0,20*** (0,08)	-0,09 (0,09)
Declining	-0,12 (0,1)	-0,02 (0,1)	0,07 (0,11)	Ref	Ref	Ref
Market primarily international	-0,16*** (0,06)	-0,08 (0,06)	-0,1 (0,08)	0,17*** (0,07)	0,08 (0,06)	-0,01 (0,07)
Better financial performance than average	0,08 (0,05)	0,03 (0,05)	0,05 (0,06)	0,03 (0,06)	0,18*** (0,06)	-0,02 (0,07)

Manpower structure (gender and qualification)**Great Britain**

<u>% of men:</u>	Managers, senior officials	-0,05 (0,05)	-0,01 (0,05)	0,001 (0,08)
	Professional occupations	-0,04 (0,03)	-0,07** (0,03)	0,09** (0,05)
	Associate professional and technical occupations	-0,06* (0,03)	-0,08** (0,03)	0,01 (0,05)
	Administrative and secretarial occupations	-0,03 (0,04)	-0,11** (0,05)	-0,01 (0,06)
	Skilled trades occupations	-0,07** (0,03)	-0,08** (0,03)	0,04 (0,04)
	Personal service occupations	-0,07 (0,07)	-0,15** (0,08)	0,11 (0,1)
	Sales and customer service occupations	-0,06* (0,04)	-0,06 (0,04)	0,08 (0,06)
	Process, plant and machine operatives	-0,07*** (0,03)	-0,09*** (0,03)	0,001 (0,04)
	Elementary occupations	-0,06* (0,03)	-0,08** (0,03)	-0,03 (0,04)
<u>% of women:</u>	Managers, senior officials	-0,03 (0,07)	-0,05 (0,07)	0,1 (0,08)
	Professional occupations	-0,02 (0,05)	-0,09* (0,05)	-0,02 (0,07)
	Associate professional and technical occupations	-0,04 (0,04)	-0,09** (0,05)	0,15** (0,07)
	Administrative and secretarial occupations	-0,10*** (0,03)	-0,10*** (0,03)	0,05 (0,05)
	Skilled trades occupations	-0,05 (0,07)	-0,14* (0,08)	-0,03 (0,09)
	Personal service occupations	0,06 (0,04)	0,02 (0,04)	-0,03 (0,05)
	Sales and customer service occupations	0,02 (0,03)	-0,05 (0,03)	0,04 (0,04)
	Process, plant and machine operatives	-0,02 (0,04)	-0,04 (0,04)	0,03 (0,05)
	Elementary occupations	Ref	Ref	Ref

France

<u>% of men:</u>	Executives or professionals	-0,10*** (0,03)	-0,08*** (0,03)	0,01 (0,03)
	Intermediary professions	-0,03 (0,03)	0,04 (0,03)	-0,05 (0,03)
	Skilled and unskilled white collars	-0,05 (0,03)	-0,06** (0,03)	-0,09*** (0,03)
	Skilled and unskilled blue collars	0,03 (0,02)	0,001 (0,02)	-0,06** (0,03)
<u>% of women:</u>	Executives or professionals	0,04 (0,06)	0,10* (0,05)	0,03 (0,06)
	Intermediary professions	-0,05 (0,04)	-0,09*** (0,03)	-0,04 (0,04)

	Skilled and unskilled white collars				0,001 (0,03)	-0,03 (0,02)	-0,02 (0,03)
	Skilled and unskilled blue collars				Ref	Ref	Ref
Intercept values	(1)	-2,67*** (0,27)	-2,67*** (0,28)	-2,58*** (0,37)	-1,22*** (0,25)	-3,02*** (0,23)	-1,47*** (0,29)
	(2)	-0,52* (0,27)	-0,49* (0,27)	0,37 (0,37)		-0,58** (0,23)	1,18*** (0,29)
	(3)	0,75*** (0,27)	1,28*** (0,27)	1,81*** (0,37)		1,48*** (0,23)	2,54*** (0,29)
	(4)	2,09*** (0,27)	2,79*** (0,27)	3,45*** (0,38)			
Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses							
	Percent Concordant	60,5 %	60,3 %	58,2 %	62,1 %	61,8 %	59,9 %
	Percent Discordant	37,8 %	37,5 %	40,4 %	37,5 %	36,2 %	38,8 %
	Percent Tied	1,7 %	2,3 %	1,5 %	0,5 %	2,0 %	1,2 %

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